04-01-2026, 01:42 PM
(This post was last modified: 04-01-2026, 02:08 PM by Knight rider.)
(03-31-2026, 12:27 PM)b789 Wrote: Use the following as your POPLA appeal:
Quote:I am the registered keeper of the vehicle and I appeal against the parking charge issued by Civil Enforcement Limited. I deny any liability.
The operator has failed to establish keeper liability under Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA), has failed to demonstrate that any enforceable contract was properly formed with the driver, and has failed to show that the charge is valid on the facts of this case.
The vehicle was present at The Cadge Pharmacy and Surgery in connection with a genuine surgery appointment attended by an occupant of the vehicle. The operator alleges that the driver failed to obtain a permit in accordance with the notified terms. That allegation is disputed. In any event, for the reasons below, this charge must be cancelled.
1. The Notice to Keeper does not comply with PoFA paragraph 9(2)(a) because it does not specify any period of parking
Paragraph 9(2)(a) of Schedule 4 to the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 requires a Notice to Keeper (NtK) to specify the period of parking to which the notice relates.
The operator’s NtK does not specify any period of parking. It merely states two ANPR timestamps labelled “From” and “To”. Those are times of camera capture, not a stated period of parking as required by PoFA paragraph 9(2)(a).
ANPR records when a vehicle passes a camera. It does not identify when any actual parking period began or ended. It does not account for time spent entering the site, manoeuvring, locating a bay, reading the signs, considering the terms, walking to the premises, returning to the vehicle, or exiting the site. Parliament chose the words “period of parking”, not “time on site” or entry and exit times.
The reverse of the NtK does nothing to cure this defect. It contains generic boilerplate about PoFA and asserts that the operator may recover the charge from the keeper, but nowhere does it specify any period of parking.
An NtK that merely lists entry and exit timestamps, rather than specifying a period of parking, does not comply with paragraph 9(2)(a). As the NtK is not fully compliant with PoFA, the operator cannot transfer liability to the keeper. There has been no admission as to the identity of the driver and POPLA is invited to find that keeper liability has not been established.
2. The entrance signage fails the BPA Code of Practice v9 because it is not positioned so as to be readable on approach
For signage issues, I rely on the BPA Code of Practice v9.
The entrance sign at this site is mounted on a gate. When the gate is open, the sign sits parallel to the direction of travel rather than facing approaching vehicles. My evidence photograph of the site entrance shows this clearly.
[entrance showing sign mounted on open gate]
Annex B of the BPA Code of Practice states that the entrance sign should be placed so that it is readable by drivers without their needing to look away from the road ahead.
That requirement is plainly not met here. A sign mounted on an open gate, sitting parallel to the direction of travel, cannot be read by a driver on approach unless the driver looks away from the road ahead and turns to the side. That is precisely what Annex B says should not be required.
This is a fundamental defect. If the entrance sign is not positioned so that it is readable on approach, the operator cannot show that a driver was given adequate notice of the parking terms before entering and parking.
3. The wording of the entrance sign is inadequate and fails to communicate the actual parking terms
The wording of the entrance sign is also deficient. It states “Permit Holders Only”, “See car park signs for terms and conditions”, and “Private Land”, with the remaining text unreadable from the approach.
That does not clearly communicate the actual parking terms. It does not explain how a customer or patient becomes authorised. It does not tell a driver at the point of entry that customers and patients are apparently expected to park first and then register on a touchscreen inside the premises. Instead, it merely imposes an apparent restriction and defers the driver to other signage after entry.
That is not adequate notice. The BPA Code of Practice requires entrance signage to tell drivers that the site is managed and that there are terms and conditions they must be aware of. A sign that is both badly positioned and substantively unclear cannot form the basis of an enforceable parking contract.
4. The signage is contradictory and fails to explain a workable mechanism by which a genuine patient becomes authorised
The large terms sign states “Pharmacy & Surgery Customer/Patient Parking” and says that customers and patients must obtain a parking permit by registering on touch screens inside the premises and entering their full and correct vehicle registration.
[main terms sign]
That is problematic when read alongside the entrance sign saying “Permit Holders Only”. A genuine patient cannot register on an internal touchscreen until they have parked and gone inside. Unless the entrance signage clearly explains that customers and patients may park and then register inside, the scheme is circular, confusing and unfair.
It effectively tells drivers that only permit holders may enter, but the only way to become authorised is to enter, park, and go inside first. At a healthcare site, genuine patients and visitors must be able to understand clearly and immediately what is required of them. CEL’s signage does not do that.
5. The terms sign fails to specify the sum payable because it states only “up to £100”
The large terms sign states that if a driver breaches the terms they “will be liable to a parking charge of up to £100”.
That wording is non-compliant and uncertain. The BPA Code of Practice v9 states at paragraph 19.4 that if an operator wishes to use keeper liability under PoFA, its signs must give adequate notice, including specifying the sum payable for unauthorised parking.
“Up to £100” does not specify a sum payable. It gives only a maximum. It does not tell the driver what charge is actually payable for any particular alleged breach. It does not explain whether the charge is £20, £60 or £100, nor what criteria determine the amount. That is the opposite of a specified sum.
If the operator later demands a fixed £100, that is not what the sign clearly stated. The sign did not specify that £100 was the charge payable. It merely stated a ceiling.
My evidence photograph of the main terms sign shows this wording clearly. The operator is put to strict proof as to where, on the signage in force on the material date, the actual charge payable for the alleged breach was clearly specified.
[wording showing “up to £100”]
6. The purported charge term is not transparent and is unfair under the Consumer Rights Act 2015
The wording “up to £100” is also problematic under the Consumer Rights Act 2015.
A trader seeking to impose a financial term on a consumer must ensure that the term is transparent and prominent. Here, the sign does not state a clear and defined sum. It leaves the amount uncertain and apparently at the operator’s discretion up to a stated maximum.
A consumer driver is entitled to know, before allegedly agreeing to anything, what financial liability is said to arise in the event of breach. A vague statement of “up to £100” is neither clear nor defined. Such a term is not transparent and is not binding.
7. If this regime was a material change from previously free patient parking, CEL must prove that compliant temporary entrance notices were displayed
There are strong indications that CEL’s regime is a relatively recent introduction or that there has at least been a material change in the parking arrangements at this site.
The BPA Code of Practice v9 requires that where there is a material change to pre-existing terms and conditions which would not be immediately apparent to a motorist entering controlled land, the operator must place additional temporary notices at the entrance for a period of not less than four months so that regular visitors do not inadvertently incur parking charges.
That is directly relevant here. This is a pharmacy and surgery site. Regular visitors would reasonably expect patient parking, and the NHS facilities listing for The Cadge Pharmacy states “Free on-site car parking”. If CEL or the landowner introduced a permit or registration regime after a previous system of ordinary free patient parking, that would plainly amount to a material change requiring prominent temporary entrance notices.
My entrance photograph shows no evidence of any temporary entrance signage warning regular users that the terms had materially changed. CEL is put to strict proof that, following the introduction of this regime, compliant temporary entrance notices were displayed for the required period.
[entrance with no temporary notices visible]
8. The NHS listing stating “Free on-site car parking” supports the position that this was legitimate patient parking and that any internal registration requirement needed to be exceptionally clear
The NHS facilities page for The Cadge Pharmacy states “Free on-site car parking”. My screenshot of that page is attached as evidence.
[NHS page stating “Free on-site car parking”]
That is highly relevant because it is a public representation about the site’s facilities. It strongly supports the position that this site is intended to provide free parking for genuine users, including patients.
The vehicle was present only briefly and in connection with a genuine surgery appointment attended by an occupant of the vehicle. That short duration is wholly consistent with normal attendance at a surgery or pharmacy site and entirely inconsistent with abuse of parking.
If parking is publicly represented as free for site users, any hidden or poorly communicated internal registration requirement must be conveyed with exceptional clarity and prominence. CEL’s signage fails that test.
9. CEL has not shown that the driver was given adequate notice of the terms before any contract was allegedly formed
The operator’s case depends on establishing that the driver saw, read and accepted the terms before parking. On the evidence, that has not been shown.
The entrance sign is badly positioned and cannot be read on approach without looking away from the road ahead. The wording of that sign is insufficient. The main terms sign contains contradictory and confusing wording. The charge itself is not properly specified. The mechanism for becoming authorised depends on going inside after parking.
At a healthcare site, where genuine patients are expected to attend appointments and use the premises, such a regime must be exceptionally clear and workable. It is not.
The operator is therefore put to strict proof of all signage in situ on the material date, including a site plan, dated photographs, distances, positioning, approach angles, and evidence that the signs were prominent and readable to a driver entering and parking in the relevant location.
10. CEL has not shown landowner authority for this site and this specific enforcement regime
As a matter of strict proof, CEL must demonstrate that it had valid landowner authority on the material date to issue and pursue parking charges at this location in its own name, and that its authority extends to this exact site and this exact permit and registration regime.
This is particularly important here because the site is a pharmacy and surgery car park, public-facing NHS information says parking is free, and the operator alleges a specific internal authorisation system involving touchscreens inside the premises. POPLA is invited to require strict proof of the contemporaneous, unredacted landowner authority contract and to scrutinise whether it actually authorises CEL to operate and enforce this particular scheme.
Conclusion
This appeal should be allowed.
CEL has failed to establish keeper liability because the Notice to Keeper does not comply with PoFA paragraph 9(2)(a). The signage also fails the BPA Code of Practice v9 in multiple respects. The entrance sign is improperly positioned, the wording is inadequate, the scheme is confusing and contradictory, the charge is not specified because the sign states only “up to £100”, there is no evidence of the temporary notices required for a material change, and the purported charge term is not transparent or fair.
In addition, this is a pharmacy and surgery site, the NHS publicly states that it provides free on-site car parking, and the vehicle was present for a brief period consistent with a genuine surgery appointment.
For all of those reasons, POPLA is invited to allow this appeal and require CEL to cancel the Parking Charge Notice.
Hi
Thanks for your reply. I have tried to submit the appeal however it will not allow me to submit points 9 and 10 and the conclusion.
How do we get around this.
Its ok. I can upload the remaining parts of the appeal on a word document.
