Quote:The car park belongs to the Pharmacy and Surgery. I have used this car park previously in the past and never had to get a permit. On the Pharmacy website on the NHS it clearly states free car parking. My partner had an appointment at the surgery at 14:20 and by 14:38 we left the car park. https://www.nhs.uk/services/pharmacy/the-cadge-pharmacy/FCV53/facilities.

Quote:No court has made any finding, and nothing has been proved. For CEL to make this stick, they would ultimately have to show what the signs said on the day, that those signs were prominent and capable of being read before parking, where the vehicle actually was, and how a genuine patient could reasonably comply with any permit process.

The NHS facilities page is important because it is an official public statement about the site’s facilities and it expressly says “Free on-site car parking”. That directly undermines CEL’s attempt to present the visit as unauthorised or chargeable. If parking is publicly represented as free for this NHS-linked pharmacy/surgery site, then either there should be no permit requirement at all for genuine users, or (if the landowner operates a “free but controlled” system) any requirement to validate/obtain authorisation would need to be made crystal clear on prominent signage, with an obvious, workable process for patients attending appointments. On your account, the occupants were exactly the type of users the car park is intended for, with an appointment at 14:20 and departure by 14:38, which is entirely consistent with normal attendance rather than abuse of parking.

So the current position for you as the keeper is that this PCN is very much “in dispute on the facts” because the operator’s allegation conflicts with the NHS-listed facility of free parking and with the reality of a genuine medical visit. The immediate priority is simply to preserve evidence (the NHS page screenshot showing “Free on-site car parking”, and anything confirming the appointment time, plus any photos of entrance/terms signage if possible), because that evidence goes directly to whether any enforceable permit term was properly brought to the driver’s attention and whether CEL’s allegation is credible in the first place.

I have checked Google Street View for the location and the latest images are from September 2024 which suggest that CEL have been introduced fairly recently. That will bring up other issues that can be used in any appeal.

For now, my advice is to make a simple initial appeal. The reason for this is that any initial appeal is almost never accepted. There is no money in it for them. What we want is their rejection with a POPLA code and we can then put together a strong appeal and putting them to poof of everything, including their standing to operate and issue PCNs at the location. This will force them to provide evidence of their contract with the landowner showing from what date they started operating there. Under the Private Parking Sincle Code of Practice (PPSCoP), they are required to have separate signs at the entrance that clearly notify users of the car park of any 'material changes' so that regular users can know of significant changes to terms of parking.

Quote:Do you know roughly when this new parking regime was introduced? Was it within the last 4 months? I ask, because there is a requirement for them to have additional signs at the entrance informing regular users of the car park that there are material changes.

This is where we are with the signage evidence, and why it is already very strong for you. I am deliberately focusing on the BPA Code of Practice v9 only for signage issues, because it sets out what a member operator’s signs are supposed to achieve in order to create any enforceable parking contract, and to be able to claim that drivers were given adequate notice of the terms and the parking charge.

The starting point is that CEL are trying to rely on signs to say a driver accepted contractual terms, breached them, and now owes a charge. That only works if the driver was given clear, prominent, readable notice of the key terms and the charge from the outset.

In your case, the entrance sign fails at the most basic level of placement and presentation. The “entrance sign” is mounted on a gate and, when the gate is open (which is the normal position when vehicles enter), the sign becomes parallel to the direction of travel. That means it is not facing the approaching driver at all.

Under the BPA Code of Practice v9 entrance signage requirements (Annex B), an entrance sign must be placed so that it is readable by drivers without their needing to look away from the road ahead. Where the sign is mounted on a gate that is open and therefore sits parallel to the direction of travel, a driver would have to turn their head away from the road in order to read it. That is a direct failure to meet Annex B’s placement requirement. A sign positioned in this way cannot give drivers adequate notice of parking terms on approach and cannot be relied upon to show that a driver was properly informed of, or agreed to, any contractual terms before parking.

A sign that is effectively turned away from the driver is self-evidently incapable of giving that notice. This point matters because it undermines CEL’s ability to claim that the driver was informed “from the start” and knowingly accepted the terms.

The actual wording of that entrance sign is also weak. It says “Permit Holders Only”, then “See car park signs for terms and conditions”, then “Private Land”, with additional small text that is unreadable from the photo. That is not a clear communication of the core parking terms. It is essentially a restriction followed by a deferral: it does not tell a driver what they must do to be authorised, it does not clearly identify the operator, it does not state the parking charge, and it pushes the reader to find other signs after they have already entered. Under BPA CoP v9 signage expectations, entrance signs should clearly communicate the type of parking and that terms apply, with key information presented prominently. A sign that is hard to see and then says “go and look elsewhere for the terms” is exactly the opposite of “adequate notice”.

There is a further contradiction when the entrance sign is read alongside the terms sign you photographed. That sign is framed as “Customer/Patient Parking” but the entrance sign is “Permit Holders Only”. The terms sign then says customers/patients must obtain a parking permit by registering inside the premises on touch screens and entering their full correct vehicle registration.

The problem is obvious: a genuine patient cannot register on an internal screen until they have parked and gone inside. So if the entrance sign is saying “permit holders only” without clearly explaining that customers/patients are permitted to park and then register inside to become authorised, the signage creates a circular and confusing regime that traps genuine visitors. BPA CoP v9 states that signage is meant to be easy to see, read and understand. A system that effectively requires the driver to breach the “permit holders only” condition in order to go inside and obtain the authorisation is not clear, not intelligible, and not workable in practice.

The main terms sign is also defective in a specific, important way: it states the parking charge as “up to £100”. The BPA CoP v9 signage section on adequate notice requires the signage to specify the sum payable for unauthorised parking. “Up to £100” does not specify a sum payable. It describes only a maximum and leaves the actual charge uncertain. If CEL then demand £100, that is not what the sign actually says is payable in every case. A driver cannot be said to have accepted a clear and certain charge term if the sign only gives a ceiling and does not explain what charge applies to what breach, how the amount is determined, or where that information is provided. That kind of vague “up to” wording is exactly the sort of ambiguity that BPA CoP v9 is meant to prevent, because drivers must be given clear notice of the charge that will be demanded.

As this is a consumer contract scenario: a trader (CEL) is attempting to impose a financial obligation on a consumer driver via standard terms displayed on signs. Under the CRA 2015, terms and consumer notices must be fair, transparent, and (for anything financial) presented prominently so the consumer can understand, before being bound, what they are signing up to.

The key CRA points are these:

The “up to £100” wording is not a clear price term. It is inherently vague because it does not tell the consumer what the charge actually is for the alleged breach. It reserves to the trader an undefined discretion to choose any figure up to a maximum, without explaining the criteria or scale. That lack of certainty and lack of transparency is exactly the kind of issue the CRA is designed to control.

Even if CEL try to argue the parking charge is a “core term” (a price term), the CRA only prevents a fairness assessment of a core price term if the term is both transparent and prominent. A vague “up to £100” statement is neither a transparent statement of price nor a properly defined liability, so it is unlikely to benefit from that protection. If it is not transparent/prominent, it remains fully assessable for fairness.

Once assessable, the fairness test is whether the term causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations to the detriment of the consumer, contrary to good faith. A term that allows CEL to allege a breach and then assert any charge up to £100, without the consumer being told the actual amount payable and the basis for it at the point of contracting, is a classic example of imbalance and lack of good faith.

So in practical terms, the CRA argument is: the signage did not clearly define the charge the consumer would become liable for, and any attempt to enforce a fixed £100 later is relying on an unclear and potentially unfair consumer notice/term. That sits neatly alongside the BPA signage point (“specify the sum payable”) and strengthens the submission that the “charge term” was not properly communicated or incorporated.

Another point that supports you is the likelihood that this parking regime is relatively new. I have checked Google Street View from September 2024 and it does not show any named parking operator managing parking at this location. That strongly suggests that CEL’s signage and enforcement could be a more recent introduction, or that it has at least materially changed since what regular visitors would have been familiar with. BPA CoP v9 includes a “material change” requirement for signage: where there has been a material change to pre-existing terms that would not be immediately apparent to motorists, the operator is expected to place additional temporary notices at the entrance for a defined period of no less than 4 months so that regular users do not get caught out. If this site previously operated as free patient parking and has moved to an internal registration/permit model, that is a textbook material change. If there were no prominent temporary entrance notices warning of the new regime, CEL cannot credibly argue that regular visitors were given fair notice that the terms had changed.

Taken together, the signage issues are not minor. The entrance sign is poorly positioned and does not face drivers; it fails to convey key terms and defers the driver to other signs after entry; it does not clearly explain how a patient becomes authorised; the main terms sign uses an uncertain charge (“up to £100”) rather than specifying a sum payable; and there are strong indicators that the regime may have been introduced or changed relatively recently without proper transitional warnings. All of that goes to the heart of enforceability, because CEL must be able to show that the driver had clear notice of the terms and the charge from the outset. On the evidence we have, they cannot.

Separately from signage, everything else in this case is dealt with under the PPSCoP rather than the BPA CoP. That includes the broader conduct issues, the adequacy of the internal registration scheme in a healthcare setting, and the fairness of enforcement against genuine patients. The NHS facilities listing stating “Free on-site car parking” and your account of a genuine appointment visit reinforce that this was exactly the intended use of the car park, and that CEL’s approach is wholly unreasonable.

So, on to the initial appeal. A successful initial appeal is as rare as hens teeth. There is no point putting a huge amount of effort into it. The aim is to get a rejection with a POPLA code and go to town with that appeal. Even then, POPLA is not truly independent and if not successful there, the decision is not binding on you and you would not pay it.

The point at which this is most likely to be won is after they issue a county court claim. A truly independent arbiter, a district judge, would easily find that there was no contract and, assuming they don't discontinue first, a claim is likely to be struck out if it ever got that far.

For now, you appeal only as the Keeper and submit the following:

Quote:I am the registered keeper of the vehicle and I dispute this Parking Charge Notice. I deny any liability.

Your Notice to Keeper is not compliant with the strict requirements of Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 and you cannot transfer liability to the keeper. In particular, it fails to comply with paragraph 9(2)(a) because it does not specify any period of parking. It merely provides ANPR timestamps (“From” and “To”), which are not a period of parking. ANPR records vehicles passing a camera and does not evidence any actual parked period. As a result, keeper liability does not apply. There will be no admission as to the identity of the driver and no assumptions may be drawn.

Further, your signage fails the BPA Code of Practice v9 requirements. The entrance sign is positioned on a gate such that, when open, it is parallel to the direction of travel and requires a driver to look away from the road ahead to read it, contrary to Annex B. The entrance sign wording also fails to provide adequate notice of the core terms and merely defers drivers to other signage after entry. In addition, the terms sign states a parking charge of “up to £100”, which does not specify a sum payable and is not transparent.

Given these fundamental defects, you have no realistic prospect of success at POPLA. Cancel this PCN now or issue a POPLA verification code.

I am under no legal obligation to name the driver and I decline to do so.

Quote:I am the registered keeper of the vehicle and I appeal against the parking charge issued by Civil Enforcement Limited. I deny any liability.

The operator has failed to establish keeper liability under Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA), has failed to demonstrate that any enforceable contract was properly formed with the driver, and has failed to show that the charge is valid on the facts of this case.

The vehicle was present at The Cadge Pharmacy and Surgery in connection with a genuine surgery appointment attended by an occupant of the vehicle. The operator alleges that the driver failed to obtain a permit in accordance with the notified terms. That allegation is disputed. In any event, for the reasons below, this charge must be cancelled.

1. The Notice to Keeper does not comply with PoFA paragraph 9(2)(a) because it does not specify any period of parking

Paragraph 9(2)(a) of Schedule 4 to the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 requires a Notice to Keeper (NtK) to specify the period of parking to which the notice relates.

The operator’s NtK does not specify any period of parking. It merely states two ANPR timestamps labelled “From” and “To”. Those are times of camera capture, not a stated period of parking as required by PoFA paragraph 9(2)(a).

ANPR records when a vehicle passes a camera. It does not identify when any actual parking period began or ended. It does not account for time spent entering the site, manoeuvring, locating a bay, reading the signs, considering the terms, walking to the premises, returning to the vehicle, or exiting the site. Parliament chose the words “period of parking”, not “time on site” or entry and exit times.

The reverse of the NtK does nothing to cure this defect. It contains generic boilerplate about PoFA and asserts that the operator may recover the charge from the keeper, but nowhere does it specify any period of parking.

An NtK that merely lists entry and exit timestamps, rather than specifying a period of parking, does not comply with paragraph 9(2)(a). As the NtK is not fully compliant with PoFA, the operator cannot transfer liability to the keeper. There has been no admission as to the identity of the driver and POPLA is invited to find that keeper liability has not been established.

2. The entrance signage fails the BPA Code of Practice v9 because it is not positioned so as to be readable on approach

For signage issues, I rely on the BPA Code of Practice v9.

The entrance sign at this site is mounted on a gate. When the gate is open, the sign sits parallel to the direction of travel rather than facing approaching vehicles. My evidence photograph of the site entrance shows this clearly.

   
[entrance showing sign mounted on open gate]

Annex B of the BPA Code of Practice states that the entrance sign should be placed so that it is readable by drivers without their needing to look away from the road ahead.

That requirement is plainly not met here. A sign mounted on an open gate, sitting parallel to the direction of travel, cannot be read by a driver on approach unless the driver looks away from the road ahead and turns to the side. That is precisely what Annex B says should not be required.

This is a fundamental defect. If the entrance sign is not positioned so that it is readable on approach, the operator cannot show that a driver was given adequate notice of the parking terms before entering and parking.

3. The wording of the entrance sign is inadequate and fails to communicate the actual parking terms

The wording of the entrance sign is also deficient. It states “Permit Holders Only”, “See car park signs for terms and conditions”, and “Private Land”, with the remaining text unreadable from the approach.

That does not clearly communicate the actual parking terms. It does not explain how a customer or patient becomes authorised. It does not tell a driver at the point of entry that customers and patients are apparently expected to park first and then register on a touchscreen inside the premises. Instead, it merely imposes an apparent restriction and defers the driver to other signage after entry.

That is not adequate notice. The BPA Code of Practice requires entrance signage to tell drivers that the site is managed and that there are terms and conditions they must be aware of. A sign that is both badly positioned and substantively unclear cannot form the basis of an enforceable parking contract.

4. The signage is contradictory and fails to explain a workable mechanism by which a genuine patient becomes authorised

The large terms sign states “Pharmacy & Surgery Customer/Patient Parking” and says that customers and patients must obtain a parking permit by registering on touch screens inside the premises and entering their full and correct vehicle registration.

   
[main terms sign]

That is problematic when read alongside the entrance sign saying “Permit Holders Only”. A genuine patient cannot register on an internal touchscreen until they have parked and gone inside. Unless the entrance signage clearly explains that customers and patients may park and then register inside, the scheme is circular, confusing and unfair.

It effectively tells drivers that only permit holders may enter, but the only way to become authorised is to enter, park, and go inside first. At a healthcare site, genuine patients and visitors must be able to understand clearly and immediately what is required of them. CEL’s signage does not do that.

5. The terms sign fails to specify the sum payable because it states only “up to £100”

The large terms sign states that if a driver breaches the terms they “will be liable to a parking charge of up to £100”.

That wording is non-compliant and uncertain. The BPA Code of Practice v9 states at paragraph 19.4 that if an operator wishes to use keeper liability under PoFA, its signs must give adequate notice, including specifying the sum payable for unauthorised parking.

“Up to £100” does not specify a sum payable. It gives only a maximum. It does not tell the driver what charge is actually payable for any particular alleged breach. It does not explain whether the charge is £20, £60 or £100, nor what criteria determine the amount. That is the opposite of a specified sum.

If the operator later demands a fixed £100, that is not what the sign clearly stated. The sign did not specify that £100 was the charge payable. It merely stated a ceiling.

My evidence photograph of the main terms sign shows this wording clearly. The operator is put to strict proof as to where, on the signage in force on the material date, the actual charge payable for the alleged breach was clearly specified.

   
[wording showing “up to £100”]

6. The purported charge term is not transparent and is unfair under the Consumer Rights Act 2015

The wording “up to £100” is also problematic under the Consumer Rights Act 2015.

A trader seeking to impose a financial term on a consumer must ensure that the term is transparent and prominent. Here, the sign does not state a clear and defined sum. It leaves the amount uncertain and apparently at the operator’s discretion up to a stated maximum.

A consumer driver is entitled to know, before allegedly agreeing to anything, what financial liability is said to arise in the event of breach. A vague statement of “up to £100” is neither clear nor defined. Such a term is not transparent and is not binding.

7. If this regime was a material change from previously free patient parking, CEL must prove that compliant temporary entrance notices were displayed

There are strong indications that CEL’s regime is a relatively recent introduction or that there has at least been a material change in the parking arrangements at this site.

The BPA Code of Practice v9 requires that where there is a material change to pre-existing terms and conditions which would not be immediately apparent to a motorist entering controlled land, the operator must place additional temporary notices at the entrance for a period of not less than four months so that regular visitors do not inadvertently incur parking charges.

That is directly relevant here. This is a pharmacy and surgery site. Regular visitors would reasonably expect patient parking, and the NHS facilities listing for The Cadge Pharmacy states “Free on-site car parking”. If CEL or the landowner introduced a permit or registration regime after a previous system of ordinary free patient parking, that would plainly amount to a material change requiring prominent temporary entrance notices.

My entrance photograph shows no evidence of any temporary entrance signage warning regular users that the terms had materially changed. CEL is put to strict proof that, following the introduction of this regime, compliant temporary entrance notices were displayed for the required period.

   
[entrance with no temporary notices visible]

8. The NHS listing stating “Free on-site car parking” supports the position that this was legitimate patient parking and that any internal registration requirement needed to be exceptionally clear

The NHS facilities page for The Cadge Pharmacy states “Free on-site car parking”. My screenshot of that page is attached as evidence.

   
[NHS page stating “Free on-site car parking”]

That is highly relevant because it is a public representation about the site’s facilities. It strongly supports the position that this site is intended to provide free parking for genuine users, including patients.

The vehicle was present only briefly and in connection with a genuine surgery appointment attended by an occupant of the vehicle. That short duration is wholly consistent with normal attendance at a surgery or pharmacy site and entirely inconsistent with abuse of parking.

If parking is publicly represented as free for site users, any hidden or poorly communicated internal registration requirement must be conveyed with exceptional clarity and prominence. CEL’s signage fails that test.

9. CEL has not shown that the driver was given adequate notice of the terms before any contract was allegedly formed

The operator’s case depends on establishing that the driver saw, read and accepted the terms before parking. On the evidence, that has not been shown.

The entrance sign is badly positioned and cannot be read on approach without looking away from the road ahead. The wording of that sign is insufficient. The main terms sign contains contradictory and confusing wording. The charge itself is not properly specified. The mechanism for becoming authorised depends on going inside after parking.

At a healthcare site, where genuine patients are expected to attend appointments and use the premises, such a regime must be exceptionally clear and workable. It is not.

The operator is therefore put to strict proof of all signage in situ on the material date, including a site plan, dated photographs, distances, positioning, approach angles, and evidence that the signs were prominent and readable to a driver entering and parking in the relevant location.

10. CEL has not shown landowner authority for this site and this specific enforcement regime

As a matter of strict proof, CEL must demonstrate that it had valid landowner authority on the material date to issue and pursue parking charges at this location in its own name, and that its authority extends to this exact site and this exact permit and registration regime.

This is particularly important here because the site is a pharmacy and surgery car park, public-facing NHS information says parking is free, and the operator alleges a specific internal authorisation system involving touchscreens inside the premises. POPLA is invited to require strict proof of the contemporaneous, unredacted landowner authority contract and to scrutinise whether it actually authorises CEL to operate and enforce this particular scheme.

Conclusion

This appeal should be allowed.

CEL has failed to establish keeper liability because the Notice to Keeper does not comply with PoFA paragraph 9(2)(a). The signage also fails the BPA Code of Practice v9 in multiple respects. The entrance sign is improperly positioned, the wording is inadequate, the scheme is confusing and contradictory, the charge is not specified because the sign states only “up to £100”, there is no evidence of the temporary notices required for a material change, and the purported charge term is not transparent or fair.

In addition, this is a pharmacy and surgery site, the NHS publicly states that it provides free on-site car parking, and the vehicle was present for a brief period consistent with a genuine surgery appointment.

For all of those reasons, POPLA is invited to allow this appeal and require CEL to cancel the Parking Charge Notice.

(03-31-2026, 12:27 PM)b789 Wrote: Use the following as your POPLA appeal:

Quote:I am the registered keeper of the vehicle and I appeal against the parking charge issued by Civil Enforcement Limited. I deny any liability.

The operator has failed to establish keeper liability under Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA), has failed to demonstrate that any enforceable contract was properly formed with the driver, and has failed to show that the charge is valid on the facts of this case.

The vehicle was present at The Cadge Pharmacy and Surgery in connection with a genuine surgery appointment attended by an occupant of the vehicle. The operator alleges that the driver failed to obtain a permit in accordance with the notified terms. That allegation is disputed. In any event, for the reasons below, this charge must be cancelled.

1. The Notice to Keeper does not comply with PoFA paragraph 9(2)(a) because it does not specify any period of parking

Paragraph 9(2)(a) of Schedule 4 to the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 requires a Notice to Keeper (NtK) to specify the period of parking to which the notice relates.

The operator’s NtK does not specify any period of parking. It merely states two ANPR timestamps labelled “From” and “To”. Those are times of camera capture, not a stated period of parking as required by PoFA paragraph 9(2)(a).

ANPR records when a vehicle passes a camera. It does not identify when any actual parking period began or ended. It does not account for time spent entering the site, manoeuvring, locating a bay, reading the signs, considering the terms, walking to the premises, returning to the vehicle, or exiting the site. Parliament chose the words “period of parking”, not “time on site” or entry and exit times.

The reverse of the NtK does nothing to cure this defect. It contains generic boilerplate about PoFA and asserts that the operator may recover the charge from the keeper, but nowhere does it specify any period of parking.

An NtK that merely lists entry and exit timestamps, rather than specifying a period of parking, does not comply with paragraph 9(2)(a). As the NtK is not fully compliant with PoFA, the operator cannot transfer liability to the keeper. There has been no admission as to the identity of the driver and POPLA is invited to find that keeper liability has not been established.

2. The entrance signage fails the BPA Code of Practice v9 because it is not positioned so as to be readable on approach

For signage issues, I rely on the BPA Code of Practice v9.

The entrance sign at this site is mounted on a gate. When the gate is open, the sign sits parallel to the direction of travel rather than facing approaching vehicles. My evidence photograph of the site entrance shows this clearly.


[entrance showing sign mounted on open gate]

Annex B of the BPA Code of Practice states that the entrance sign should be placed so that it is readable by drivers without their needing to look away from the road ahead.

That requirement is plainly not met here. A sign mounted on an open gate, sitting parallel to the direction of travel, cannot be read by a driver on approach unless the driver looks away from the road ahead and turns to the side. That is precisely what Annex B says should not be required.

This is a fundamental defect. If the entrance sign is not positioned so that it is readable on approach, the operator cannot show that a driver was given adequate notice of the parking terms before entering and parking.

3. The wording of the entrance sign is inadequate and fails to communicate the actual parking terms

The wording of the entrance sign is also deficient. It states “Permit Holders Only”, “See car park signs for terms and conditions”, and “Private Land”, with the remaining text unreadable from the approach.

That does not clearly communicate the actual parking terms. It does not explain how a customer or patient becomes authorised. It does not tell a driver at the point of entry that customers and patients are apparently expected to park first and then register on a touchscreen inside the premises. Instead, it merely imposes an apparent restriction and defers the driver to other signage after entry.

That is not adequate notice. The BPA Code of Practice requires entrance signage to tell drivers that the site is managed and that there are terms and conditions they must be aware of. A sign that is both badly positioned and substantively unclear cannot form the basis of an enforceable parking contract.

4. The signage is contradictory and fails to explain a workable mechanism by which a genuine patient becomes authorised

The large terms sign states “Pharmacy & Surgery Customer/Patient Parking” and says that customers and patients must obtain a parking permit by registering on touch screens inside the premises and entering their full and correct vehicle registration.


[main terms sign]

That is problematic when read alongside the entrance sign saying “Permit Holders Only”. A genuine patient cannot register on an internal touchscreen until they have parked and gone inside. Unless the entrance signage clearly explains that customers and patients may park and then register inside, the scheme is circular, confusing and unfair.

It effectively tells drivers that only permit holders may enter, but the only way to become authorised is to enter, park, and go inside first. At a healthcare site, genuine patients and visitors must be able to understand clearly and immediately what is required of them. CEL’s signage does not do that.

5. The terms sign fails to specify the sum payable because it states only “up to £100”

The large terms sign states that if a driver breaches the terms they “will be liable to a parking charge of up to £100”.

That wording is non-compliant and uncertain. The BPA Code of Practice v9 states at paragraph 19.4 that if an operator wishes to use keeper liability under PoFA, its signs must give adequate notice, including specifying the sum payable for unauthorised parking.

“Up to £100” does not specify a sum payable. It gives only a maximum. It does not tell the driver what charge is actually payable for any particular alleged breach. It does not explain whether the charge is £20, £60 or £100, nor what criteria determine the amount. That is the opposite of a specified sum.

If the operator later demands a fixed £100, that is not what the sign clearly stated. The sign did not specify that £100 was the charge payable. It merely stated a ceiling.

My evidence photograph of the main terms sign shows this wording clearly. The operator is put to strict proof as to where, on the signage in force on the material date, the actual charge payable for the alleged breach was clearly specified.


[wording showing “up to £100”]

6. The purported charge term is not transparent and is unfair under the Consumer Rights Act 2015

The wording “up to £100” is also problematic under the Consumer Rights Act 2015.

A trader seeking to impose a financial term on a consumer must ensure that the term is transparent and prominent. Here, the sign does not state a clear and defined sum. It leaves the amount uncertain and apparently at the operator’s discretion up to a stated maximum.

A consumer driver is entitled to know, before allegedly agreeing to anything, what financial liability is said to arise in the event of breach. A vague statement of “up to £100” is neither clear nor defined. Such a term is not transparent and is not binding.

7. If this regime was a material change from previously free patient parking, CEL must prove that compliant temporary entrance notices were displayed

There are strong indications that CEL’s regime is a relatively recent introduction or that there has at least been a material change in the parking arrangements at this site.

The BPA Code of Practice v9 requires that where there is a material change to pre-existing terms and conditions which would not be immediately apparent to a motorist entering controlled land, the operator must place additional temporary notices at the entrance for a period of not less than four months so that regular visitors do not inadvertently incur parking charges.

That is directly relevant here. This is a pharmacy and surgery site. Regular visitors would reasonably expect patient parking, and the NHS facilities listing for The Cadge Pharmacy states “Free on-site car parking”. If CEL or the landowner introduced a permit or registration regime after a previous system of ordinary free patient parking, that would plainly amount to a material change requiring prominent temporary entrance notices.

My entrance photograph shows no evidence of any temporary entrance signage warning regular users that the terms had materially changed. CEL is put to strict proof that, following the introduction of this regime, compliant temporary entrance notices were displayed for the required period.


[entrance with no temporary notices visible]

8. The NHS listing stating “Free on-site car parking” supports the position that this was legitimate patient parking and that any internal registration requirement needed to be exceptionally clear

The NHS facilities page for The Cadge Pharmacy states “Free on-site car parking”. My screenshot of that page is attached as evidence.


[NHS page stating “Free on-site car parking”]

That is highly relevant because it is a public representation about the site’s facilities. It strongly supports the position that this site is intended to provide free parking for genuine users, including patients.

The vehicle was present only briefly and in connection with a genuine surgery appointment attended by an occupant of the vehicle. That short duration is wholly consistent with normal attendance at a surgery or pharmacy site and entirely inconsistent with abuse of parking.

If parking is publicly represented as free for site users, any hidden or poorly communicated internal registration requirement must be conveyed with exceptional clarity and prominence. CEL’s signage fails that test.

9. CEL has not shown that the driver was given adequate notice of the terms before any contract was allegedly formed

The operator’s case depends on establishing that the driver saw, read and accepted the terms before parking. On the evidence, that has not been shown.

The entrance sign is badly positioned and cannot be read on approach without looking away from the road ahead. The wording of that sign is insufficient. The main terms sign contains contradictory and confusing wording. The charge itself is not properly specified. The mechanism for becoming authorised depends on going inside after parking.

At a healthcare site, where genuine patients are expected to attend appointments and use the premises, such a regime must be exceptionally clear and workable. It is not.

The operator is therefore put to strict proof of all signage in situ on the material date, including a site plan, dated photographs, distances, positioning, approach angles, and evidence that the signs were prominent and readable to a driver entering and parking in the relevant location.

10. CEL has not shown landowner authority for this site and this specific enforcement regime

As a matter of strict proof, CEL must demonstrate that it had valid landowner authority on the material date to issue and pursue parking charges at this location in its own name, and that its authority extends to this exact site and this exact permit and registration regime.

This is particularly important here because the site is a pharmacy and surgery car park, public-facing NHS information says parking is free, and the operator alleges a specific internal authorisation system involving touchscreens inside the premises. POPLA is invited to require strict proof of the contemporaneous, unredacted landowner authority contract and to scrutinise whether it actually authorises CEL to operate and enforce this particular scheme.

Conclusion

This appeal should be allowed.

CEL has failed to establish keeper liability because the Notice to Keeper does not comply with PoFA paragraph 9(2)(a). The signage also fails the BPA Code of Practice v9 in multiple respects. The entrance sign is improperly positioned, the wording is inadequate, the scheme is confusing and contradictory, the charge is not specified because the sign states only “up to £100”, there is no evidence of the temporary notices required for a material change, and the purported charge term is not transparent or fair.

In addition, this is a pharmacy and surgery site, the NHS publicly states that it provides free on-site car parking, and the vehicle was present for a brief period consistent with a genuine surgery appointment.

For all of those reasons, POPLA is invited to allow this appeal and require CEL to cancel the Parking Charge Notice.