UKPC Parking-Parked in an area where no parking allowed w/blue Badge WF1 2DF

[b789]

@rhbmcse, with an issue date of 5th August, you have until 4pm on Monday 24th August to submit your defence. If you submit an Acknowledgement of Service (AoS) before then, you would then have until 4pm on Monday 7th September to submit your defence.

You only need to submit an AoS if you need extra time to prepare your defence. If you want to submit an AoS then follow the instructions in this linked PDF:

https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/qfj81ckwc...r9v4u&dl=0

I now generally advise submitting a short defence through MCOL. Whilst MCOL is limited in that it does not allow formatting or the attachment of transcripts and other documents, it has the important advantage of being submitted instantly and entered into the court system immediately. Given the continuing administrative failures at the CNBC, that is now the safer course. Any authorities, transcripts or other documents can be filed later with the Witness Statement if the claim progresses that far. (unlikely)

You will need to copy and paste the defence into the MCOL defence text box. It has been checked to ensure that it fits within the 122-line limit.

1. The Defendant denies the claim in its entirety. The Defendant denies any liability to the Claimant and denies that any debt is owed.

PRELIMINARY MATTER – DEFICIENT PARTICULARS OF CLAIM

Yes. I would strengthen paragraphs 2–8 in exactly that way. The claim form does not state that detailed Particulars will follow; it presents the wording on the form itself as the Particulars of Claim.

2. As a preliminary matter, the Particulars of Claim fail adequately to comply with CPR 16.4 and Practice Direction 16. Although the Claimant identifies a date, location and generic description of the alleged contravention, it has failed properly to plead the contractual cause of action upon which the claim depends.

3. The Particulars state only that the Defendant is pursued for "breach of the terms on the signs (the contract)" and give the reason "Parked In AN Area Where No Parking Is Allowed." The Claimant has not identified the precise contractual term or wording allegedly breached, the obligation said to arise from that term, or the conduct said to constitute acceptance of the alleged contract.

4. CPR 16.4 requires Particulars of Claim to contain a concise statement of the facts upon which the Claimant relies. Where an agreement is alleged to have arisen by conduct, Practice Direction 16 paragraph 7.5 requires the conduct relied upon to be specified and to state by whom, when and where the acts constituting that conduct were done.

5. In Liberty Homes (Kent) Ltd v Rajakanthan & Ors [2022] EWHC 2201 (TCC), Mrs Justice Jefford DBE held at paragraph 42 that it is implicit that Particulars of Claim must set out the claimant's case as to whether an alleged agreement is oral, in writing, made by conduct, or some combination thereof. The generic reference in this claim to "the terms on the signs" does not identify the contractual term upon which the Claimant actually relies.

6. Furthermore, Practice Direction 7C paragraph 5.2 expressly requires detailed Particulars of Claim either to be included within the online claim form or, alternatively, to be served separately. Where the latter course is chosen, the Claimant must state in the online claim form that "detailed particulars of claim will follow" and provide a brief summary of the claim. The Claimant did not do so.

7. The Claimant therefore elected to include its detailed Particulars within the claim form pursuant to PD7C paragraph 5.2(1). The online character limit does not excuse deficient pleading because PD7C paragraph 5.2(2) expressly provided the Claimant with the alternative of serving properly detailed Particulars separately. The Claimant chose not to use that procedure and should not now be permitted to require the Defendant to reconstruct its contractual case from evidence produced later. Nor could any later document properly be treated as the separate detailed Particulars contemplated by paragraph 5.2(2), when the mandatory indication that such Particulars would follow was absent from the claim form.

8. The Court is therefore invited to consider striking out the claim pursuant to CPR 3.4. Alternatively, if the Claimant wishes to alter or supplement its pleaded contractual case, the Defendant submits that this should require the appropriate amendment to the Particulars, with the Defendant afforded permission to amend the Defence accordingly.

NO LIABILITY AS DRIVER OR KEEPER

9. The Defendant was the registered keeper of the vehicle at the material time. The Defendant has never admitted to being the driver and has never identified the driver to the Claimant.

10. The Particulars expressly pursue the Defendant as the driver and, in the alternative, as keeper pursuant to Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 ("PoFA").

11. The Claimant cannot categorically identify the Defendant as the driver. The Particulars plead no fact whatsoever establishing that the Defendant was driving. Registered keeper status does not identify the driver, and the Claimant is put to strict proof by actual evidence identifying the Defendant as the driver.

12. The Defendant was under no legal obligation to identify the driver to a private parking operator. Schedule 4 PoFA instead provides a statutory mechanism whereby a creditor may, subject to strict compliance with its requirements, recover an unpaid parking charge from a keeper where the driver has not been identified.

13. The Defendant's decision not to identify the driver does not establish that the Defendant was driving and cannot cure any failure by the Claimant to comply with the statutory requirements necessary to hold the keeper liable.

FAILURE TO ESTABLISH KEEPER LIABILITY UNDER POFA

14. The Claimant's alternative case pursuant to Schedule 4 PoFA is denied.

15. The alleged event occurred on 17 October 2025. No Notice to Driver having been given at the material time, paragraph 9 of Schedule 4 applied. The Notice to Keeper bears an issue date of 25 October 2025 but was not received and delivered to the Defendant until 7 November 2025.

16. Paragraphs 9(4) and 9(5) require the Notice to Keeper to be delivered within the period of 14 days beginning with the day after that on which the specified period of parking ended. The relevant period therefore expired on 31 October 2025.

17. Paragraph 9(6) provides that a notice sent by post is presumed, unless the contrary is proved, to have been delivered on the second working day after the day on which it was posted. The statutory presumption therefore depends upon the actual date of posting, not merely the date printed upon or generated on the notice.

18. During the appeal process the Claimant was expressly required to prove when the Notice to Keeper was actually entered into the postal system. The Claimant failed to provide such evidence and relied only upon the date appearing on the notice.

19. The Claimant's own Accredited Trade Association Code expressly requires parking operators to retain a record of the date of posting of a notice, not simply the date upon which the notice was generated, including the date upon which any third-party mail consolidator actually placed it into the postal system.

20. The Claimant is therefore put to strict proof by contemporaneous postal dispatch records, proof of posting, mail consolidator records or equivalent evidence of the actual date upon which the Notice to Keeper entered the postal system. The issue date printed upon the notice is not itself evidence of posting on that date.

21. In the absence of such evidence, particularly where the Notice to Keeper was actually delivered on 7 November 2025, the Claimant cannot establish that the Notice was delivered within the mandatory relevant period and cannot establish keeper liability pursuant to Schedule 4 PoFA.

THE VEHICLE WAS NOT PARKED

22. Further and in the alternative, the Defendant denies that the circumstances amounted to the contravention pleaded.

23. The Particulars expressly allege that the vehicle was "Parked In AN Area Where No Parking Is Allowed." The vehicle was stationary for approximately 65 seconds solely to facilitate the loading or unloading of pre-ordered heavy goods. It was not parked.

24. The Defendant relies upon Jopson v Homeguard Services Ltd [2016] B9GF0A9E, a County Court appeal decision of HHJ Harris QC, in which the Court distinguished parking from the temporary stopping of a vehicle for the purpose of loading or unloading.

25. The distinction is directly relevant. The Claimant has elected to plead that the vehicle was parked. A temporary stop of approximately 65 seconds while a loading operation was undertaken is materially different from parking.

26. If the Claimant now attempts to characterise the alleged contravention as prohibited stopping rather than prohibited parking, that would be materially different from the case actually pleaded.

CONSIDERATION PERIOD AND DE MINIMIS DURATION

27. Further and in the alternative, a period of approximately 65 seconds is substantially shorter than the consideration period ordinarily applicable before a parking contract can be treated as having been accepted.

28. The Claimant is put to strict proof of the consideration period registered and applicable to this particular site and restriction at the material time and of any lawful basis upon which it contends that the consideration period had already ended within approximately 65 seconds.

29. In any event, the exceptionally brief duration is de minimis and further supports the Defendant's case that this was a temporary loading operation rather than a parking event.

PROHIBITIVE TERMS AND ABSENCE OF CONTRACTUAL OFFER

30. The Claimant is put to strict proof of the exact wording of the signage governing the precise location concerned.

31. If the signage stated that parking was not permitted in that area, the Defendant denies that such prohibitive wording constituted an offer to park capable of acceptance. A prohibition against parking does not, without more, amount to a contractual offer permitting the prohibited activity in return for payment of a parking charge.

32. The Claimant must therefore establish the precise contractual offer allegedly made, how it was capable of acceptance, and the precise term allegedly breached. Those matters are not pleaded in the Particulars of Claim.

EQUALITY ACT 2010

33. The circumstances additionally involved a disabled Blue Badge holder and the loading or unloading of heavy goods.

34. The Defendant relies upon the duties arising under sections 20 and 29 of the Equality Act 2010 and puts the Claimant to strict proof that appropriate consideration was given to the disability-related circumstances and any reasonable adjustment required before imposing a parking charge for an activity lasting approximately 65 seconds.

35. The Defendant does not contend that possession of a Blue Badge creates an unrestricted entitlement to park on private land. The issue is whether the Claimant acted lawfully in enforcing the alleged restriction without reasonable adjustment for the disability-related circumstances of the exceptionally brief loading operation.

ADDITIONAL £70

36. The Particulars claim £170 described merely as "the total of the PC and damages". The underlying parking charge was £100. No proper explanation or calculation of the additional £70 is pleaded.

37. The Defendant denies that the additional £70 is recoverable and puts the Claimant to strict proof of the contractual term said to authorise it, when and how that additional liability arose, and what loss or service the purported damages represent.

38. Further, insofar as the Claimant relies upon Schedule 4 PoFA against the Defendant as keeper, paragraph 4(5) provides that the maximum sum recoverable from a keeper by virtue of that statutory liability is the amount specified in the Notice to Keeper.

CLAIMANT'S AUTHORITY

39. The Claimant is put to strict proof that at the material time it had sufficient authority from the landowner to manage the precise area concerned, impose the particular restriction relied upon, recover parking charges in its own name and institute legal proceedings in respect of those charges.

You are not counterclaiming. You are ONLY defending the claim. Once submitted, you are then waiting for the Claimant to acknowledge the defence and then you will be sent an N180 Directions Questionnaire where you will be able to select your local county court and give any dates you would not be available to attend a hearing. You will also be asked the same for any unavailable dates for a pointless and time wasting "mediation phone call' I will cover that later, once you receive a date for it.