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PPS pcn, whilst delivering parcels for amazon.
#11
@zyno, not unexpected and so we move on to the POPLA appeal. Have you managed to get any more evidence of the driver operating as a courier making Amazon deliveries at the time? If so, make sure you add that evidence to the POPLA appeal and adjust the wording in this appeal accordingly.

You have 33 days from the date of the initial appeal rejection to submit the POPLA appeal. So, first I need you to go through this draft POPLA appeal and let me know if there are any things that need adjusting. Once we've established that the appeal is good to go, you can submit it as a PDF attachment. In the appeal box, just say "see attached PDF appeal".

Quote:POPLA APPEAL

Operator: Private Parking Solutions (London) Ltd (PPS)
Location: Donnington House, 2A Sutton Court Road, Sutton, SM1 4SY
Date of alleged contravention: 1 October 2026
Allegation: Failure to display a valid permit

Preliminary submission

This appeal is submitted solely in the capacity of registered keeper. The identity of the driver has not been disclosed, and no admission is made concerning that identity. PPS expressly acknowledged this position in its rejection of the initial appeal.

The alleged contravention arose while the vehicle was being used in connection with Amazon courier deliveries. The appellant's position is that the vehicle was temporarily stopped in connection with delivery activity rather than being parked for an ordinary residential or recreational purpose. The available Amazon records confirm a scheduled delivery block between 19:45 and 22:15 on 1 October 2026, encompassing the alleged contravention at approximately 20:29. Although those records do not independently identify the precise delivery address, they provide contemporaneous supporting evidence of the vehicle's courier activity.

The appellant disputes PPS's entitlement to recover the charge on six grounds: failure to comply with the mandatory requirements of Schedule 4 to the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA); failure to establish the appellant's liability as keeper; failure to demonstrate contractual authority and compliance with the landowner's requirements concerning couriers; uncertainty concerning the person responsible for recording the alleged contravention and the method of enforcement; failure to establish an enforceable contract; and inadequate consideration of the nature and duration of the vehicle's stationary presence.

The appellant additionally invites POPLA to have regard to the principles reflected in the Government's Private Parking Code of Practice, published on 20 October 2026 pursuant to the Parking (Code of Practice) Act 2019. It is acknowledged that this Code was not operative on the date of the alleged contravention and cannot impose retrospective obligations. Nevertheless, its provisions are relevant as persuasive regulatory context where they reinforce existing legislation, contractual principles or obligations already contained in the applicable Private Parking Sector Single Code of Practice (PPSCoP).

1. Failure to comply with PoFA Schedule 4: no statutory keeper liability

PPS seeks to recover a parking charge from the registered keeper without having established the identity of the driver. Its entitlement to do so under Schedule 4 is conditional upon compliance with the applicable statutory requirements. It is submitted that its Notice to Keeper (NtK) fails to satisfy paragraphs 9(2)(a) and 9(2)(e).

1.1 Failure to specify the period of parking — paragraph 9(2)(a)

Paragraph 9(2)(a) requires the NtK to specify the period of parking to which the notice relates. PPS instead states:

"The period of parking to which this notice relates is the period that immediately preceded the Incident Date and Time."

That formulation identifies neither a commencement time nor a duration. The expression "immediately preceded" is inherently indeterminate and does not permit the recipient to establish the temporal limits of the alleged parking period. Parliament required specification of a period of parking, not merely an incident timestamp accompanied by an undefined reference to an earlier interval.

In rejecting the initial appeal, PPS disclosed that its operative allegedly observed the vehicle between 20:21:53 and 20:29:22, an interval of seven minutes and twenty-nine seconds. PPS therefore appears to have possessed precise observation records but chose not to specify that interval within the NtK. Its subsequent reliance upon those records cannot retrospectively amend the contents of the notice originally served.

There is an essential distinction between evidence that a vehicle was stationary during an observation period and compliance with a statutory requirement to specify the period of parking in the NtK. The latter is a condition of exercising the statutory right to recover the charge from the keeper. The former cannot simply be substituted for it.

1.2 Failure to comply with paragraph 9(2)(e)

Paragraph 9(2)(e) requires the creditor to state that it does not know both the name of the driver and a current address for service for the driver, and to invite the keeper to pay the unpaid parking charges or, if the keeper was not driving, to provide the prescribed driver particulars and pass the notice to the driver.

These are cumulative statutory requirements. The obligation to make the specified statement concerning the creditor's knowledge is not displaced by providing payment instructions or inviting the keeper to identify the driver.

The NtK does not expressly state that PPS does not know both the driver's name and current address for service. Instead, PPS relies upon a conditional warning concerning the consequences of those particulars remaining unknown after the statutory 28-day period. Such wording addresses the separate requirement under paragraph 9(2)(f) and does not necessarily satisfy paragraph 9(2)(e).

PPS's rejection is particularly revealing. It claims compliance because the NtK identifies the creditor, provides payment instructions and invites the keeper to provide the driver's particulars. Identifying the creditor addresses paragraph 9(2)(h), while the remaining matters do not establish compliance with the opening requirement of paragraph 9(2)(e). PPS has conspicuously failed to identify where the requisite statement appears within its notice.

There is a further concern regarding the statement:

"We, the Creditor, now require this amount to be paid using one of the payment methods described overleaf."

This is expressed as an unconditional demand rather than the statutory invitation contemplated by paragraph 9(2)(e)(i). While the appellant acknowledges that PoFA does not necessarily require verbatim reproduction of its wording, an operator must communicate the substance of the statutory requirements accurately, particularly where the recipient's personal liability has not been established.

The contrast is illustrated by Annex C of the Government's forthcoming statutory Code, whose example notice wording distinguishes the driver's underlying obligation from the options available to the keeper. Although illustrative rather than mandatory, that distinction reinforces the importance of not presenting an unestablished keeper liability as an existing debt.

1.3 Mandatory statutory conditions cannot be disregarded as minor technicalities

Parliament enacted Schedule 4 to establish a conditional statutory mechanism for recovering certain unpaid parking charges from keepers who have not been established to be the liable drivers. The conditions prescribed by Parliament govern the existence of that entitlement; they are not discretionary drafting guidelines.

Consequently, a failure to satisfy an applicable mandatory condition cannot be disregarded merely because an assessor regards the omission as minor, considers that the keeper understood the allegation, or is satisfied that the operator has otherwise demonstrated a parking contravention. Partial or substantial compliance is not a substitute for satisfying the statutory conditions as properly interpreted.

This is expressly reinforced by the introduction to the Government's statutory Code, which confirms that failure to comply with Schedule 4 forfeits the statutory right to recover charges from the keeper under PoFA. That statement reflects the existing legislative framework rather than creating a new requirement.

The appellant therefore requests that POPLA determine compliance with paragraphs 9(2)(a) and 9(2)(e) as a preliminary issue. If either mandatory condition remains unsatisfied, PPS cannot rely upon Schedule 4 to recover the charge from this appellant.

2. No presumption that the keeper was driving

PPS has expressly acknowledged that the appellant appealed as registered keeper and has not identified the driver. Nevertheless, its rejection concentrates upon evidence that the vehicle was stationary without a displayed permit, as though that finding necessarily established the recipient's liability.

It does not. Evidence of an alleged contravention by an unidentified driver is not evidence that the registered keeper was driving, nor does it dispense with the statutory requirements for transferring liability.

PoFA creates no general presumption that the registered keeper was the driver. Nor does a keeper's decision not to identify the driver, without additional evidence, establish that the keeper was driving. The operator must demonstrate either that the appellant was personally liable as driver or that the statutory conditions enabling recovery from the keeper have been satisfied.

The difference between the industry-authored PPSCoP and the Government's forthcoming statutory Code is noteworthy. The former permits an operator to regard failure to identify the driver as potential evidence concerning driver identity, whereas paragraph 8.1.3 of the Government's Code expressly prohibits presuming that the keeper was driving. Neither provision can override PoFA or relieve PPS of the burden of establishing its case.

The appellant respectfully submits that PPS's rejection improperly conflates proof of the alleged permit contravention with proof of keeper liability. POPLA is requested to maintain that distinction throughout its assessment.

3. Landowner authority and the specific treatment of Amazon couriers

This ground is particularly material to the present case because the vehicle was being used for Amazon courier deliveries during the relevant period.

Paragraph 14.1(e) of the PPSCoP applicable on 1 October 2026 expressly requires the operator's written landowner authorisation to address applicable parking terms, including appropriate permissions and exemptions for persons stopping for short periods, specifically identifying delivery drivers and couriers. Paragraph 14.1(f) additionally requires the written authorisation to identify the means by which parking charges will be issued.

These requirements were already in force under the industry Code at the material time. They have been substantially carried forward into the Government's forthcoming statutory Code.

The significance is that PPS cannot establish the full extent of its enforcement authority merely by asserting that a vehicle without a displayed permit was unauthorised. The actual instructions agreed with the landowner are directly relevant to whether temporary courier activity was prohibited, permitted, exempted or subject to particular conditions.

PPS is therefore put to strict proof of its contractual standing and the specific landowner-approved arrangements concerning delivery activity. The appellant requires the production of the contemporaneous, signed landowner agreement, together with any relevant schedules, site-specific instructions or amendments, establishing:

1. The identity and authority of the landowner or managing agent, the precise boundaries of the controlled land and the duration of PPS's appointment, including confirmation that its authority remained operative on 1 October 2026.
2. PPS's authority to offer parking contracts, impose charges and recover them in its own name.
3. The parking restrictions and exemptions applicable to commercial delivery drivers, Amazon couriers, postal workers and other persons temporarily attending the premises to deliver or collect goods.
4. Any permitted delivery locations, loading or unloading arrangements, maximum stopping periods or procedures for obtaining temporary access.
5. The instructions given to enforcement personnel concerning vehicles temporarily stopped for courier deliveries, including how such activity was to be distinguished from ordinary parking.
6. The authorised method of enforcement, including the circumstances in which postal notices could be issued without first serving a Notice to Driver.

Commercially sensitive financial information may be redacted, provided the redactions do not conceal the relevant authority, restrictions, exemptions or enforcement instructions.

The appellant does not contend that all couriers enjoy an automatic exemption. The issue is whether the landowner authorised PPS to impose this charge against a vehicle engaged in the type of short-duration delivery activity contemplated by paragraph 14.1(e), and what actual conditions governed such activity. Those questions cannot properly be determined without adequate evidence of the landowner's instructions.

The Amazon delivery block records are consistent with the vehicle's use for courier work during the relevant evening, although they do not independently prove delivery to Donnington House. This limitation does not excuse PPS from demonstrating the contractual restrictions and exemptions upon which it relies.

4. Identity and status of the operative, self-ticketing and failure to serve a Notice to Driver

The photographs were obtained by a person physically present at the location, apparently over an interval exceeding seven minutes, yet no Notice to Driver was affixed to the vehicle or otherwise served. Instead, PPS subsequently issued a postal NtK.

The appellant acknowledges that PoFA permits a notice to be issued directly to the keeper under paragraph 9 where no Notice to Driver has been given, subject to the applicable statutory conditions. Accordingly, the absence of a windscreen notice is not advanced as an automatic breach of PoFA. Nevertheless, the identity and status of the person recording the alleged contravention are material to determining which provisions of the applicable PPSCoP governed the enforcement process.

PPS is therefore required to establish whether the individual was:

(a) an employee of PPS acting as a parking attendant;

(b) a contractor or agent undertaking enforcement on its behalf; or

(c) a resident, caretaker, managing agent, landowner representative or other third party acting as a self-ticketer.

The appellant requires PPS to disclose the operative's employment or contractual status, relevant identification number, contemporaneous observation notes and the original timestamped photographic record. PPS must also identify the instructions governing the decision to issue a postal notice rather than serve a Notice to Driver at the vehicle.

4.1 If the evidence was obtained by a self-ticketer

Section 15.1 of the applicable PPSCoP imposes specific requirements where evidence is gathered by a third party. These include appropriate registration and acceptance of the Code's requirements, an operator audit of the site, photographic evidence supporting the alleged contravention and quality assurance checks where a postal charge is issued.

If the individual was a self-ticketer, PPS is put to proof of compliance with those requirements, including its records of the third party's authorisation, the site audit and the photographic quality assurance process.

Paragraph 15.2 of the Government's forthcoming statutory Code goes further by expressly requiring evidence explaining why a Notice to Driver could not reasonably have been given or affixed to the vehicle where photographic evidence is supplied by a self-ticketer.

Although that additional requirement was not operative on 1 October 2026, it illustrates the regulatory significance of the distinction between conventional attendant enforcement and self-ticketing.

In this case, where the vehicle was allegedly observed for more than seven minutes, the appellant requests an explanation of why no windscreen notice was served. If PPS relies upon self-ticketing, the assessor should scrutinise the circumstances and require evidence of compliance with the applicable section 15.1 requirements rather than assume that photographs supplied by an unidentified third party were sufficient.

4.2 If the individual was an employed parking attendant

If the operative was employed directly by PPS, the self-ticketing requirements do not apply merely because a postal NtK was subsequently issued. However, PPS should still substantiate the accuracy of the attendant's contemporaneous records and demonstrate that the means of enforcement employed was consistent with its landowner authorisation under paragraph 14.1(f).

The appellant does not invite POPLA to infer misconduct simply from the absence of a windscreen notice. The submission is that PPS has not identified the operative's status or adequately explained the enforcement procedure, notwithstanding that those matters determine the applicability of distinct Code requirements.

5. Temporary courier deliveries, loading and unloading, and Jopson v Homeguard Services Ltd

The appellant disputes PPS's apparent assumption that a stationary vehicle without a displayed permit must necessarily have been engaged in ordinary parking.

The circumstances involved the vehicle's use in connection with Amazon courier deliveries. The contemporaneous Amazon block records confirm that the relevant delivery allocation ran from 19:45 until 22:15 on the evening of the alleged contravention. Although detailed address-level delivery records have not been obtainable from Amazon, the evidence supports the stated commercial delivery context.

In Jopson v Homeguard Services Ltd [2016] B9GF0A9E, HHJ Harris QC distinguished temporary stopping for loading or unloading from parking in the ordinary contractual sense. The judgment is particularly relevant to residential developments, where lawful access for delivering goods may necessarily involve a vehicle stopping temporarily.

The appellant does not contend that Jopson confers blanket immunity upon Amazon couriers, nor that every period during which a delivery vehicle is unattended necessarily constitutes loading or unloading. The distinction depends upon the actual nature, purpose and duration of the activity, together with the contractual terms governing the premises.

Nevertheless, PPS cannot establish its case simply by demonstrating that the vehicle was unattended and no valid permit was displayed. It must establish that the relevant landowner-approved terms prohibited the particular activity and that the conduct fell within an enforceable restriction.

That is precisely why disclosure of the landowner's arrangements under paragraph 14.1(e) is material rather than incidental.

PPS's asserted observation interval of 20:21:53 to 20:29:22 does not, without further contextual evidence, conclusively determine when a contractual parking period commenced or whether the stationary activity constituted ordinary parking rather than activity incidental to a delivery.

The applicable PPSCoP also provides for consideration periods, although the appellant does not assert an unconditional entitlement to leave a vehicle unattended for five minutes. Any applicable period must be evaluated by reference to the actual circumstances and the driver's conduct.

The Government's forthcoming Code, including paragraph 2.22, reinforces the distinction between recording a vehicle's presence and determining the commencement of a contractual parking period. That paragraph is not relied upon as a direct breach in this attendant-observation case. The central question remains whether PPS has established the nature of the alleged parking activity and its contractual basis.

6. Failure to establish an enforceable contract and adequate signage

PPS describes the site as "PRIVATE LAND, PERMIT HOLDERS ONLY" and states that vehicles without a valid permit are unauthorised. The appellant disputes that this description alone establishes an enforceable contractual charge.

PPS must identify the contractual offer allegedly made to a motorist lacking a valid permit, the terms upon which that offer could be accepted and the conduct said to constitute acceptance. A prohibition upon unauthorised parking is not necessarily equivalent to an offer permitting otherwise prohibited parking in exchange for £100.

Although restrictive signage is not invariably incapable of creating enforceable obligations, its actual contractual effect must be established. The decision in ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67 does not dispense with the fundamental requirements of contractual formation, adequate notice and lawful authority.

There is also a separate evidential concern. The alleged contravention occurred after 20:20 on an October evening, during darkness. PPS is therefore required to demonstrate that its entrance signs and contractual terms were adequately visible and legible in the prevailing conditions, particularly the permit restriction, the £100 charge and any applicable provisions concerning temporary stopping.

The appellant requires contemporaneous or otherwise reliable evidence of the entrance signage, a plan identifying the relevant signs and the vehicle's location, and photographs accurately representing nighttime visibility. Reliance upon daylight images or isolated close-ups of signs does not, without more, establish that the material terms were adequately communicated to an arriving motorist.

The principles concerning adequate contractual notice are reflected in Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest [2000] EWCA Civ 106, the applicable signage provisions of the PPSCoP and section 3 of the forthcoming Government Code.

The appellant further submits that, in a residential development where courier activity may be anticipated, the adequacy of signage must be considered alongside the landowner-approved restrictions and exemptions. PPS must demonstrate not merely that a permit requirement was displayed, but that the actual terms relied upon gave rise to the contractual charge alleged in these circumstances.

Conclusion

The primary issue in this appeal is whether PPS has established the statutory entitlement to recover the parking charge from the registered keeper. The operator has not demonstrated compliance with the distinct mandatory requirements of paragraphs 9(2)(a) and 9(2)(e) of Schedule 4 to PoFA. Its subsequent production of observation records and assertion that the vehicle was without a permit cannot retrospectively remedy a defective NtK or establish the keeper's personal liability.

The appellant emphasises that Schedule 4 must be applied according to the conditions enacted by Parliament. An assessor's view that an identified statutory omission is merely technical or insignificant cannot substitute for determining whether the mandatory requirement has actually been satisfied.

In the alternative, PPS has failed to substantiate the full extent of its landowner authority, including the specific treatment of delivery drivers and couriers expressly contemplated by paragraph 14.1(e) of the applicable PPSCoP. This is directly relevant because the alleged contravention arose while the vehicle was being used for Amazon courier work.

PPS has additionally failed to identify satisfactorily the person who recorded the contravention, establish whether self-ticketing requirements applied, or explain why a postal notice was issued without service of a Notice to Driver. The appellant also disputes the contractual basis of the charge, the adequacy of the nighttime signage and the assumption that temporary courier-related stopping necessarily constituted ordinary parking.

The appellant respectfully requests that POPLA determine the PoFA keeper-liability issues first. If PPS has failed to satisfy either applicable mandatory requirement, its statutory entitlement to recover the charge from the keeper does not arise, irrespective of whether an unidentified driver might otherwise have incurred an enforceable obligation.

Should the assessor consider the remaining grounds necessary, PPS is required to establish the relevant contractual and evidential matters on the balance of probabilities, including its standing, the landowner's actual courier arrangements and the lawful basis of the alleged charge.

For these reasons, the appellant requests that the appeal be allowed and the Parking Charge Notice cancelled.
Never argue with stupid people. They will drag you down to their level and then beat you with experience. - Mark Twain


Messages In This Thread
RE: PPS pcn, whilst delivering parcels for amazon. - by b789 - 10-22-2026, 11:18 AM

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