PCN - Premier Park - Aspects Leisure Park Bristol

[b789]

@onFourWheels, their rejection clearly does not actually address the important points in your appeal.

They simply assert that their "photographic evidence" shows the vehicle was parked in contravention. To date, however, they have produced no evidence whatsoever of a failure to display a Blue Badge. Two photographs of the rear of a vehicle are not evidence of what was or was not displayed in the windscreen/dashboard area. Evidence of that allegation would require a clear, contemporaneous and unobstructed image of the relevant windscreen/dashboard area. They have provided nothing of the sort.

Their willingness to reduce the charge to £20 under the Appeals Charter does not rescue the underlying PCN. It looks rather more like an attempt to extract something rather than defend a fundamentally defective notice. More importantly, POPLA is not there to decide mitigation. Our appeal will be based primarily on Premier Park's failure to establish liability and its failure to prove the alleged contravention.

The NtK has two clear Schedule 4 PoFA failures.

First, paragraph 9(2)(f) requires the NtK to contain the prescribed warning that, if the statutory conditions are satisfied, the creditor will have the right to recover the unpaid charge from the Keeper. Premier Park's NtK instead says it will have the right to recover it "from the driver of the vehicle". That is not paragraph 9(2)(f) compliance. Nearly getting the statutory wording right is not compliance.

Secondly, paragraph 9(2)(a) requires the NtK to specify "the period of parking to which the notice relates." Premier Park has not stated a period of parking. It has invented a single "incident time" of 13:00 and then vaguely described the parking period as the period "immediately preceding" that time. That does not identify any actual period at all. Worse still, the photographs presently supplied are timestamped around 12:40, and the driver believes the vehicle had left before 13:00. Premier Park will therefore be put to strict proof of its assertion that the vehicle was actually present and observed at 13:00. Simply printing 13:00 on an NtK does not make it evidence.

This is the point I want made forensically to POPLA: Keeper liability under Schedule 4 is binary. An operator acquires that statutory right only if the applicable requirements of Schedule 4 are complied with. It is not enough to comply with most of them, or to use wording which approximately resembles the statute. Here, Premier Park has failed paragraph 9(2)(f) and paragraph 9(2)(a). The driver has not been identified, so Premier Park has no alternative route to liability against the registered Keeper.

Their rejection does not engage with either failure. It merely repeats the alleged parking term and makes an irrelevant £20 offer. That will be dealt with properly in the POPLA appeal.

You have 33 days from the date of Premier Park’s rejection to submit the POPLA appeal — the stated 28-day period plus 5 days allowed for service. After that the POPLA code will expire.

For the actual appeal, use the following but submit it as a PDF attachment. Do not use their webform. Simply state to refer to the attached PDF:

POPLA APPEAL

Operator: Premier Park Ltd
PCN: 3505***
POPLA Verification Code: 666267****
Appellant: Registered Keeper

I appeal as the registered keeper. The identity of the driver has not been disclosed and is not admitted. Premier Park Ltd ("the Operator") must therefore establish, by evidence, a lawful basis upon which this appellant is personally liable for the parking charge.

This appeal is not advanced on mitigation. The Operator's offer to accept £20 pursuant to the Appeals Charter is immaterial to the legal and evidential issues which POPLA is required to determine.

The appeal is advanced on the following grounds:

1. The Notice to Keeper fails the mandatory requirements of Schedule 4 to the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 ("PoFA"), in particular paragraph 9(2)(f).
2. The Notice to Keeper also fails paragraph 9(2)(a), because it does not specify the required period of parking.
3. The Operator has failed to prove that the alleged contravention occurred at the stated incident time of 13:00 or, indeed, at any properly identified material time.
4. The Operator has failed to provide evidence establishing that a Blue Badge was not displayed.
5. The Operator is put to strict proof that the actual contractual signage applicable to the precise bay complied with the Private Parking Sector Single Code of Practice ("PPSCoP"), including the specific requirements applicable to accessible parking.
6. The Operator is put to strict proof of its standing and landowner authority to manage this particular land, impose these particular terms, issue parking charges and enforce them in its own name.
7. The Operator's rejection does not cure, or substantively answer, any of the above deficiencies.

The assessor is respectfully invited to determine the keeper-liability issue first. If no liability has transferred to the registered keeper, that disposes of the appeal irrespective of any alleged contractual breach by an unidentified driver.

1. Failure to establish keeper liability: paragraph 9(2)(f)

Schedule 4 PoFA provides a limited statutory exception to the ordinary position that contractual liability rests with the contracting party, namely the driver. The right to recover an unpaid parking charge from a vehicle keeper is entirely conditional upon compliance with the requirements Parliament prescribed.

PoFA Paragraph 4(1) creates the potential right to recover from the keeper, but paragraph 4(2) makes that right expressly conditional upon the applicable conditions of Schedule 4 being met.

Where no Notice to Driver was given, paragraph 9 applies.

The statutory scheme is therefore binary. Either the applicable requirements have been complied with and keeper liability may arise, or they have not and it does not.

There is no statutory doctrine of "substantial compliance", "near compliance" or "compliance in substance". The fact that an operator may reproduce much of the wording of Schedule 4 does not excuse failure to include a mandatory requirement.

Premier Park's Notice fails paragraph 9(2)(f).

Paragraph 9(2)(f) requires the Notice to Keeper to warn the keeper that, if the applicable statutory conditions are fulfilled, the creditor will have the right to recover the unpaid parking charge from the keeper.

Premier Park's Notice instead states:

"...we will have the right to recover the parking charge amount that remains unpaid from the driver of the vehicle..."

That is not the statutory warning. It is not merely imperfectly expressed. It identifies the wrong person.

The distinction is fundamental. Premier Park's alleged contractual cause of action against the driver exists, if at all, independently of PoFA. The purpose of paragraph 9(2)(f) is specifically to warn a keeper of the statutory consequence by which liability may be transferred to that keeper.

Premier Park has not given that warning.

The assessor is therefore requested not to substitute wording which the Operator omitted, nor to treat wording referring to recovery from the driver as though it referred to recovery from the keeper.

It plainly does not. A notice cannot satisfy a statutory requirement merely because it resembles the statutory language in other respects.

Accordingly, paragraph 9(2)(f) has not been complied with and keeper liability has not arisen.

That finding alone should determine the appeal.

2. Separate failure under paragraph 9(2)(a): no specified period of parking

There is an independent failure under paragraph 9(2)(a). That provision requires the Notice to Keeper to specify:

"the vehicle, the relevant land on which it was parked and the period of parking to which the notice relates".

The statutory requirement is for a period of parking. Premier Park has not specified one.

Instead, its Notice gives a single "Incident Time/Date" of:

13:00 on 25 August 2026

and then seeks to describe the parking period merely as the period "immediately preceding" that time.That does not specify a period.

A "period" necessarily denotes some ascertainable temporal extent. An undefined interval said merely to precede a single point in time does not tell the recipient when the alleged parking period commenced, when it ended, or what its duration was.

"Immediately preceding 13:00" could describe seconds, minutes or a materially longer interval. That ambiguity is particularly important here because the Operator's disclosed photographs are timestamped approximately nineteen minutes earlier.

The statutory wording is deliberate: paragraph 9(2)(a) requires a "period of parking", not merely a single incident time. That distinction has already been upheld persuasively on appeal in Premier Parking Solutions Ltd v Brennan (2023). Premier Park has stated only "13:00" and an undefined period "immediately preceding" it, which is not a specified period of parking.

Premier Park cannot circumvent that requirement by inventing a clock time and declaring that some unspecified period before it constitutes the relevant parking period.

The Notice therefore also fails paragraph 9(2)(a). That is a second independent reason why keeper liability has not arisen.

3. The stated incident time of 13:00 is unsupported and appears to have been selected without any disclosed evidential basis

Premier Park states that the relevant "Incident Time" was 13:00. However, the only photographs disclosed with the Notice to Keeper are timestamped 12:40:49 and 12:40:50.

There is therefore, on the face of the Notice itself, no contemporaneous evidence whatsoever that the vehicle was present at 13:00. This is not an ANPR case in which entry and exit times are automatically recorded by a camera system. The Operator must therefore have derived the stated time of 13:00 from some other contemporaneous source if that time is genuine.

Premier Park is accordingly put to strict proof of the evidential basis upon which 13:00 was selected and inserted into the Notice. The Operator must explain:

• what contemporaneous evidence demonstrates that the vehicle was still present at 13:00;
• who or what recorded that time;
• when that record was made;
• whether the time was generated by a handheld device, patrol record, photographic record, electronic log or some other system;
• and why none of that evidence was disclosed with the Notice to Keeper.

Absent such evidence, the 13:00 time appears to be no more than an unsupported assertion selected by the Operator after the event.

That is particularly serious because Premier Park has then attempted to use that unsupported single time as the reference point for the alleged "period of parking", describing the relevant period merely as the period "immediately preceding" 13:00.

That approach is impermissible.

An operator cannot cure the statutory requirement to specify a period of parking merely by selecting an arbitrary clock time and then asserting that the relevant period is whatever undefined period preceded it.

If that were sufficient, any operator could simply invent a time, state that the vehicle was parked for some unspecified period before that time, and thereby avoid the clear wording of paragraph 9(2)(a). That would render the statutory requirement for a specified "period of parking" meaningless.

Paragraph 9(2)(a) requires the Notice to specify the period of parking to which the notice relates. It does not permit an operator to substitute an unsubstantiated incident time plus an undefined preceding interval.

The defect is therefore twofold:

1. the Operator has not specified any actual period of parking; and
2. the single time used as the temporal anchor for its vague "preceding period" is itself unsupported by any evidence disclosed to the keeper.

If Premier Park now produces contemporaneous evidence showing that the vehicle was present at 13:00, it must still explain why that evidence was omitted from the Notice and why the Notice did not simply state the actual period of parking which that evidence supposedly establishes.

The later production of evidence would not alter the fact that the Notice, as issued, failed to specify the required period of parking. The statutory question is whether the Notice to Keeper complied with paragraph 9(2)(a) when given...

It did not.

And if Premier Park cannot produce contemporaneous evidence supporting 13:00 at all, then the entire temporal basis of its allegation is undermined.

4. No evidence has been produced proving failure to display a Blue Badge

The alleged contravention is:

"Parked in Disabled Bay without clearly displaying a Valid Disabled Badge."

To date, Premier Park has produced no evidence capable of establishing that allegation. The photographs supplied with the Notice show the rear of the vehicle. A rear view of a vehicle is not evidence of what was or was not displayed in the windscreen or dashboard area.

The allegation is specifically one of non-display. Reliable evidence of non-display therefore requires a contemporaneous, clear and unobstructed view of the area in which the badge was required to be displayed.

The Operator has provided no such evidence.

This is not a matter of requiring the Operator to prove a negative in the abstract. Premier Park has itself chosen to allege a specific observable fact: that no valid Blue Badge was displayed.

It must prove that fact.

A photograph which does not show the relevant area cannot do so. If Premier Park now relies upon further photographs, the assessor is requested to examine those images critically and determine:

• whether the image clearly depicts the windscreen/dashboard area;
• whether the view is unobstructed;
• whether the image is of sufficient resolution to support a finding of non-display;
• whether it is contemporaneous;
• the exact timestamp of the image; and
• whether that timestamp establishes the alleged contravention at the Operator's stated incident time of 13:00.

A photograph showing no badge at 12:40 would prove, at most, what was visible at 12:40. It would not prove that the vehicle was present at 13:00.

The Operator must prove the contravention it actually alleged, at the material time it actually stated.

5. Strict proof of the contractual signage applicable to the precise parking bay

The Operator is also put to strict proof of the actual contractual signs applicable to the precise disabled bay in which the vehicle was parked.

It is insufficient for Premier Park to produce generic stock photographs of signs, undated close-up images, or photographs taken from positions which do not represent the driver's actual approach to and use of the bay.

The current PPSCoP requires signs and surface markings to be visible, legible and unambiguous to drivers. Clause 3.1.3 further requires signs displaying the specific terms and conditions to be positioned so that drivers have an opportunity to read them, to be sufficiently large and legible on approach, and to use a font size appropriate to the likely position of the driver.

More importantly for this particular case, Clause 4 specifically addresses accessible parking.

Where the Blue Badge scheme is recognised and display of a Blue Badge is required, Clause 4.3 requires the signs to make the relevant obligations clear, including where within the vehicle the badge must be displayed.

Clause 4.4 then imposes the following express requirement:

"The parking operator must ensure that at least one sign containing the terms and conditions for parking can be viewed without the driver needing to leave the vehicle, in order for drivers with a disability to be able to make an informed decision on whether to park at the premises."

That requirement is particularly important here because this is an allegation concerning use of a designated disabled bay by a genuinely disabled Blue Badge holder. The Operator must therefore prove, with contemporaneous site-specific evidence, that at the material time:

1. at least one sign displaying the applicable terms and conditions could actually be viewed from within the vehicle;
2. that sign was positioned such that a disabled driver was not required to leave the vehicle in order to read it;
3. the sign was sufficiently proximate to and applicable to the precise bay used;
4. the wording concerning Blue Badge display was clearly legible;
5. the location within the vehicle where the badge had to be displayed was expressly stated;
6. the parking charge for breach was itself sufficiently prominent;
7. the sign was unobstructed and visible in the lighting and physical conditions prevailing at the time; and
8. the sign relied upon was actually in situ on 25 August 2026.

The PPSCoP additionally requires signs to be conspicuous and legible in relevant lighting conditions and at a height which takes account of whether they are to be viewed from inside a vehicle or after leaving it, including by a driver using a wheelchair.

I therefore require Premier Park to produce:

• a contemporaneous site plan showing the precise location of the vehicle and every contractual sign;
• contemporaneous photographs demonstrating the driver's actual line of sight to those signs;
• a photograph of the sign taken from approximately the driver's eye level within the vehicle;
• the dimensions of the sign;
• the font size of the relevant contractual wording;
• the height of the sign above ground level;
• the distance between the sign and the relevant bay; and
• evidence that the signs photographed were the signs in place on the date of the alleged event.

A close-up photograph of a sign proves only what the sign says when photographed at close range. It does not prove that the sign was visible, readable or contractually incorporated from the driver's position.

If the Operator cannot establish compliance with the accessible-parking signage requirements applicable to this particular bay, it cannot establish that the alleged term formed part of any contract with the driver.

The current PPSCoP expressly recognises that parking operators must have regard to Equality Act obligations and make reasonable adaptations for disabled people, and specifically identifies accessible parking as an area requiring additional consideration.

6. Strict proof of landowner authority and standing

Premier Park is put to strict proof that it possessed sufficient authority from the landowner to:

• operate on the relevant land;
• impose the particular terms relied upon;
• enter into parking contracts with motorists;
• issue parking charges for breach of those terms;
• retain the proceeds of those charges as creditor; and
• enforce those charges in its own name, including through civil proceedings.

Premier Park is not presumed to own the land. Its standing must therefore derive from its arrangements with the landowner or another person legally entitled to confer the necessary authority.

Clause 14.1 of the PPSCoP is explicit.

Before a parking charge may be issued on land managed on behalf of a landowner, the Operator must obtain written confirmation from the landowner covering specified matters. Those requirements are not optional. The written authority must cover:

(a) the identity of the landowner;

(b) a boundary map of the land being managed;

(c) any byelaws applying to the land in relation to parking management;

(d) the permission granted to the Operator and the duration of that permission;

(e) the parking terms and conditions which the Operator is authorised to impose, including applicable free periods, tariffs, permissions and exemptions;

(f) the means by which parking charges are to be issued;

(g) responsibility for obtaining relevant consents, including planning or advertising consents relating to signs;

(h) the obligations under which the Operator is working, including compliance with the PPSCoP and ATA requirements;

(i) the documentation the Operator may be required to provide to authorised bodies concerning its relationship with the landowner; and

(j) the Operator's approach to the handling of parking-charge appeals.

These are the PPSCoP minimum documentary requirements before a parking charge may be issued. The Operator is therefore put to strict proof by production of the contemporaneous written authority which addresses each of those matters.

A generic "letter of authority", witness statement, or template assertion that Premier Park is "authorised to manage parking" is not sufficient if it does not establish the matters required by Clause 14.1. In particular, a generic document which fails to identify the precise boundaries, the contractual terms authorised, the duration of the authority, the applicable exemptions or the enforcement powers conferred cannot demonstrate compliance with Clause 14.1.

There is a further and separate issue concerning Premier Park's asserted status as creditor.

Annex G of the PPSCoP contains the sector's own sample landowner/operator notice. Its model wording expressly records that the landowner understands that the operator is the creditor for parking charges and has discretion as to enforcement, expressly including proceeding through the County Court.

That is significant. It demonstrates that the Code itself distinguishes between a mere permission to manage a site and authority sufficient for an operator to act as creditor and enforce charges in its own name.

Accordingly, if Premier Park seeks to establish that it has standing to pursue this charge in its own name, the evidence must establish not merely that somebody authorised it to put up signs or issue tickets, but that:

1. the person granting the authority was the landowner or otherwise had legal authority to confer those rights;
2. Premier Park was authorised to enter contracts with drivers;
3. Premier Park was authorised to impose the specific Blue Badge-display condition relied upon;
4. Premier Park was authorised to issue charges for breach of that condition;
5. Premier Park was the creditor entitled to recover those charges;
6. the authority extended to enforcement in Premier Park's own name;
7. the authority was in force on 25 August 2026; and
8. the precise bay in question fell within the defined contractual boundary.

A mere statement that Premier Park is "authorised to manage parking at Aspects Leisure Park" does not answer those questions. Nor would a redacted document be sufficient if the redactions conceal the very provisions necessary to establish authority, duration, scope, exemptions or enforcement rights.

The burden rests upon the Operator because those matters are entirely within its knowledge and possession. If Premier Park declines to produce evidence establishing those matters, POPLA cannot properly infer that the necessary authority exists.

7. Premier Park's rejection does not answer the appeal

Premier Park's rejection simply states, in substance, that the signage requires Blue Badges to be displayed and that its photographic evidence demonstrates a contravention.

That response does not address the legal and evidential issues.

• It does not explain how the Notice complies with paragraph 9(2)(f).
• It does not explain why the statutory warning refers to recovery from the driver rather than the keeper.
• It does not identify the required period of parking under paragraph 9(2)(a).
• It does not explain the discrepancy between its 13:00 incident time and the photographs timestamped approximately 12:40.
• It does not provide evidence that the vehicle remained present at 13:00.
• It does not provide a clear contemporaneous image of the windscreen/dashboard proving non-display.
• It does not establish compliance with the specific accessible-parking signage requirements.
• It does not establish landowner authority.

The Operator's £20 offer under the Appeals Charter does not answer any of those matters. POPLA is not being asked to determine whether £20 would be a reasonable compromise. It is being asked whether this Operator has established that this appellant is liable for this parking charge.

8. Correct sequence of determination

To avoid conflating distinct legal questions, the assessor is respectfully invited to determine this appeal in the following order.

First: Has Premier Park proved that the appellant was the driver?

No. The driver has not been identified.

Second: Has Premier Park complied with Schedule 4 sufficiently to transfer liability to the keeper?

No. The Notice fails paragraph 9(2)(f).

It independently fails paragraph 9(2)(a).

Keeper liability therefore does not arise.

Third: Even if liability against a driver were relevant, has Premier Park proved the alleged contravention at the time specified?

Not on the evidence disclosed. Its photographs are approximately nineteen minutes earlier than the alleged incident time and do not show the relevant windscreen/dashboard area.

Fourth: Has Premier Park proved that the contractual term relied upon was properly incorporated by compliant signage applicable to this particular disabled bay?

That remains for Premier Park to prove.

Fifth: Has Premier Park proved that it possessed the requisite landowner authority and standing to offer the alleged contract, impose the relevant condition, issue the charge and enforce it in its own name?

Again, that remains for Premier Park to prove.

These are separate questions. A finding in Premier Park's favour on one does not cure failure on another.

Conclusion

The appeal should be allowed.

The driver has not been identified.

Premier Park's Notice to Keeper fails the mandatory requirements of paragraph 9(2)(f) and paragraph 9(2)(a) of Schedule 4 PoFA. Consequently, no keeper liability has arisen.

Separately, the Operator has failed to produce evidence proving that:

• the vehicle was present at the alleged 13:00 incident time;
• any relevant observation occurred at 13:00;
• no Blue Badge was displayed in the windscreen/dashboard area at the relevant time;
• the contractual signage applicable to the precise disabled bay complied with the accessible-parking provisions of the PPSCoP; or
• Premier Park possessed the necessary landowner authority and standing to impose and enforce this charge.

PoFA compliance is not achieved by approximating the statutory wording. Contractual incorporation is not established by producing an isolated close-up photograph of a sign. Standing is not established by a generic assertion of authority.

Each necessary element must be proved. Premier Park has the burden of doing so.

In the absence of that proof, the Parking Charge Notice cannot lawfully be enforced against this appellant and the appeal should be allowed.