PCN - received while vehicle was being loaded for 10 minutes.

[KHarHar]

Hello! Thanks for clicking on my post


Today I received a PCN from a company called Parking Control Management. It states that I parked for a duration of 10 minutes on private land which is PERMIT HOLDERS ONLY.






https://postimg.cc/gallery/Sbwf7Jj


The driver was collecting some furniture from a Facebook marketplace seller, and I am surprised that it was even 10 minutes. Now they want at least £60!

I have appealed the notice on the grounds that the vehicle was being loaded with heavy furniture from a resident, and that I was not the driver of the car.

I have also attached a screenshot of a message from the seller telling me that there is a car park which can be used to "load and stuff" alongside their full address.

What are the chances of this winning on appeal, and if not, do I have a leg to stand on to continue to complain and push ahead?

I'm currently fighting with a Real Estate agent who is not giving me a permit for my separate and unrelated parking space at home (where I got ticketed), so this £60 is really hitting me!


Thanks for reading! Any thoughts/help would be much appreciated.

[b789]

@KHarHar, the first thing I need to know is exactly what you said in the initial appeal. You say that you appealed on the basis that "I was not the driver", but I would want to see the precise wording you submitted to make sure the driver was not inadvertently identified elsewhere in the appeal. Please post the appeal exactly as sent.

Also, don't think of this as a £60 ticket. It is a £100 private parking invoice, with a 40% "mugs discount" if you pay quickly. The £60 is simply the discounted amount they offer to encourage early payment before you have properly challenged it.

On the substantive point, genuine short-duration loading of heavy furniture from a resident gives you a credible argument, particularly under Jopson v Homeguard, where the court distinguished temporary loading/unloading from ordinary parking. The seller's message expressly telling you that the car park could be used to "load and stuff" is useful evidence.

I would not expect PCM to willingly accept the appeal, but that does not mean the charge is necessarily enforceable. If they reject it, the exact appeal wording, the signage and the evidence of the loading activity become important.

[KHarHar]

@KHarHar, the first thing I need to know is exactly what you said in the initial appeal. You say that you appealed on the basis that "I was not the driver", but I would want to see the precise wording you submitted to make sure the driver was not inadvertently identified elsewhere in the appeal. Please post the appeal exactly as sent.

Also, don't think of this as a £60 ticket. It is a £100 private parking invoice, with a 40% "mugs discount" if you pay quickly. The £60 is simply the discounted amount they offer to encourage early payment before you have properly challenged it.

On the substantive point, genuine short-duration loading of heavy furniture from a resident gives you a credible argument, particularly under Jopson v Homeguard, where the court distinguished temporary loading/unloading from ordinary parking. The seller's message expressly telling you that the car park could be used to "load and stuff" is useful evidence.

I would not expect PCM to willingly accept the appeal, but that does not mean the charge is necessarily enforceable. If they reject it, the exact appeal wording, the signage and the evidence of the loading activity become important.

Thanks for the response b789! 

My appeal reads as follows:

"Dear Sir/Madam,

I am writing to formally appeal the above Parking Charge Notice as the Registered Keeper of the vehicle.

1. Absence of Parking / Active Loading:

The vehicle was not "parked" at the material time. It was briefly stopped for approximately 10 minutes strictly to perform the active loading of heavy furniture from a nearby residential property. Active loading/unloading is distinct from parking under standard contract law. I have attached a message from the resident showing the address, as well as identifying the area as an area where furniture can be loaded.

2. Consideration & Grace Period:

Under the accredited operator Code of Practice, operators must allow a mandatory consideration period upon entry and a grace period. A total duration of 10 minutes while actively transferring heavy goods falls within reasonable consideration and loading parameters.

3. Keeper Liability:

I was not the driver of the vehicle at the time of the alleged event. As the registered keeper, I am under no statutory obligation to identify the driver. Should you choose to pursue this matter, you must demonstrate strict compliance with all provisions of Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 to transfer liability to the keeper.

Given that the vehicle was actively loading within a reasonable consideration frame and no breach of terms occurred, I request that this charge notice be canceled immediately.

Yours faithfully,"



I hope that helps. 

Thanks

[b789]

Yes, that's good enough. However, no initial appeal is ever successful, no matter how well pleaded. When you receive the appeal rejection, show it to me and I will advise further on how to proceed.

This is easily defended using the Jopson v Homeguard precedent.

[KHarHar]

Yes, that's good enough. However, no initial appeal is ever successful, no matter how well pleaded. When you receive the appeal rejection, show it to me and I will advise further on how to proceed.

This is easily defended using the Jopson v Homeguard precedent.

Cannot thank you enough for taking the time. Will do so when it is rejected. 

Thanks!

[KHarHar]

Yes, that's good enough. However, no initial appeal is ever successful, no matter how well pleaded. When you receive the appeal rejection, show it to me and I will advise further on how to proceed.

This is easily defended using the Jopson v Homeguard precedent.

Hi b789, me again!

I have received the result of the appeal and predictably received a rejection. The rejection is as follows:

"Thank you for your appeal against the above Parking Charge Notice.                 

At Parking Control Management (UK) Ltd, we consider all appeals on a case-by-case basis, taking into account all relevant information and evidence, including your submissions. After careful consideration, it is unfortunate that I am writing to you today to advise that on this occasion, your appeal has been unsuccessful.

The decision to uphold your parking charge notice has been made on the following basis:

The vehicle was parked in a manner that contravenes the terms and conditions for the use of the private land on which it was photographed. These terms and conditions are clearly stipulated throughout the area and upon review, the operator is confident that the Parking Charge Notice (PCN) was correctly issued, in line with these signs.

On this occasion, the vehicle was parked in an area for permit holders only.
The advertised contractual terms require drivers parked in this area to have their vehicle registered for a valid virtual permit. This is clearly outlined by signage and the onus is on the driver to ensure compliance with the terms. I can confirm that the vehicle in question did not have a valid virtual permit registered at the time of enforcement.
You claim to be ‘stopped’ opposed to ‘parked’. This is not accepted. The Private Parking Sector Single Code of Practice defines “parked” as “a vehicle being stationary other than in the course of driving” and further specifies that “a vehicle may be deemed to be parked whether or not the driver has left the vehicle and/or turned the ignition off”. In this case, it is clear that the vehicle was parked.
It has been noted that you are appealing the charge as the keeper of the vehicle and are not prepared to name the driver. Under Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (‘the Act’), Parking Control Management (UK) Ltd may seek to recover unpaid parking charges from the registered keeper of the vehicle. The conditions of the Act have been satisfied and as, to date, the full name and “address for service” for the driver have not been provided, we reserve the right to exercise our right to purse you, as the keeper.
It can be assumed until proved otherwise, that the keeper of the vehicle is the driver. This is a reasonable assumption. The keeper has refused to name the driver, as is their right, but the case of Eliot v Loake makes it clear that in the absence of sufficient evidence to the contrary the keeper is assumed to be the driver.
Ultimately, while we appreciate the circumstances you have outlined and appreciate that this is not a situation anyone would like to find themselves in, the terms and conditions for the use of the land have been put in place to ensure fair usage for all motorists and support the needs of our client. We are confident that these conditions are clearly communicated to all motorists by way of the signage and that this signage fully complies with industry standards.

Either due to the reason for issue and/or the insufficient evidence provided to support the details of your appeal, we have considered this PCN and found that it does meet the criteria outlined in the Appeals Charter under Annex F of the Private Parking Sector Single Code of Practice. Therefore, if no further evidence is provided, we will deem this to be our final decision.

You have now reached the end of our internal appeals procedure and therefore you now have two options; either pay or appeal to the Independent Appeals Service (IAS) - you cannot do both."




What do you think my next step should be? And in your opinion, do you think I should just pay or is it worth appealing?


Kind regards

[b789]

@KHarHar, PCM's attempt to rely on Elliott v Loake is utterly pathetic.

They actually say:

"It can be assumed until proved otherwise, that the keeper of the vehicle is the driver."

No. It cannot.

There is no legal presumption whatsoever that the registered keeper was the driver merely because they are the registered keeper. The burden is not somehow reversed so that the keeper has to prove who was driving, prove that they were not driving, or account for every person who might have been driving the vehicle.

If PCM want to allege that the keeper was personally the driver, PCM must produce evidence identifying that person as the driver. Simply knowing who the registered keeper is proves nothing about who was behind the wheel on a particular day.

That is obvious in the real world. A vehicle may be driven, with the keeper's permission, by a spouse, partner, relative, friend, employee or any other appropriately insured person. The registered keeper recorded by DVLA is not a record of who was driving at any particular time.

PCM's reliance on Elliott v Loake is particularly desperate. Elliott v Loake was a criminal road-traffic prosecution, not a civil claim for an alleged parking contract, and it did not establish any legal presumption that a registered keeper was the driver. The court reached its conclusion because there was actual evidence linking the defendant to the vehicle and undermining his account. It is therefore no authority whatsoever for PCM's extraordinary proposition that "the keeper is assumed to be the driver until proved otherwise".

PCM are attempting to turn a fact-specific criminal case into a fictitious rule of civil liability which simply does not exist. That is not a minor misunderstanding of the law; it is a grossly misleading representation of what the case actually decided. It is precisely the sort of conduct that gives this former-clamping industry its reputation for using legal-sounding boilerplate to intimidate keepers into paying charges they may not owe.

The position is simple: PCM do not know who was driving. They openly admit that the keeper has not identified the driver. They cannot cure that evidential gap by inventing a presumption and then demanding that the keeper disprove it. If they wish to rely on driver liability, they need evidence identifying the driver. If they wish to rely on keeper liability, they must establish compliance with Schedule 4 of PoFA. Elliott v Loake does neither for them.

The particularly ridiculous part is that PCM themselves admit that you have refused to identify the driver. Precisely. They therefore do not know who the driver was. Unless you tell them, and you are under no legal obligation to do so, they have no way of knowing.

That is exactly why Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 exists. It provides a separate statutory route by which a parking company may, if it has fully complied with all the statutory requirements, pursue a keeper without needing to know who was driving.

So PCM need to decide which case they are actually pursuing:

• Driver liability: identify the driver and produce evidence that the keeper was that person; or
  
• Keeper liability under PoFA: demonstrate compliance with Schedule 4.
  

What they cannot do is invent a third option:

"We don't know who was driving, therefore we will simply assume it was you until you prove otherwise."

That is complete and utter nonsense.

And PCM have also conspicuously failed to deal with the actual reason the vehicle was there. This was not somebody simply parking up because it was convenient. The vehicle was there briefly while heavy furniture was being collected from a resident, and there is contemporaneous evidence from that resident specifically saying that the car park could be used to "load and stuff".

That brings Jopson v Homeguard Services Ltd [2016] B9GF0A9E squarely into the discussion. In that residential parking case, heard on appeal by HHJ Harris QC, the court distinguished ordinary parking from the temporary stopping of a vehicle for the purpose of loading or unloading. The judgment specifically recognised that bringing heavy or bulky items to or from residential premises may require a vehicle to stop close to the building and that such activity is not automatically the same thing as "parking" in the ordinary sense.

That is why PCM's response is so feeble. Instead of engaging with Jopson and the factual question of genuine loading/unloading, they quote an industry-code definition saying that a stationary vehicle can be "deemed to be parked". That does not somehow erase the distinction identified by a Circuit Judge in an actual residential parking appeal.

So PCM have managed to dodge both central issues: they do not know who the driver was, yet pretend Elliott v Loake allows them simply to assume it was the keeper; and they have not properly addressed the evidence that the vehicle was present for the genuine loading of heavy furniture, despite Jopson being directly relevant to precisely that sort of residential loading activity.

That is a considerably better basis for the IAS appeal than simply arguing that "it was only ten minutes". You can now use the IAS. I would not pay the £60 simply because PCM rejected their own invoice. Remember, this is still a £100 private parking invoice with a 40% mugs discount, not a £60 fine.

If you are prepared to see it through rather than capitulate merely because PCM said no, I would submit an IAS appeal concentrating on the genuine loading/unloading, the resident's evidence, the signage/contractual terms and PCM's misuse of Elliott v Loake. An IAS rejection would not make the £100 legally owed; ultimately PCM would still have to prove its case if it chose to pursue it through court.

Before I draft the IAS appeal, though, please post photographs of the actual signs at the site, particularly the entrance sign and the "Permit Holders Only" terms sign. Those could materially affect how I would frame it.

[KHarHar]

@KHarHar, PCM's attempt to rely on Elliott v Loake is utterly pathetic.

They actually say:

"It can be assumed until proved otherwise, that the keeper of the vehicle is the driver."

No. It cannot.

There is no legal presumption whatsoever that the registered keeper was the driver merely because they are the registered keeper. The burden is not somehow reversed so that the keeper has to prove who was driving, prove that they were not driving, or account for every person who might have been driving the vehicle.

If PCM want to allege that the keeper was personally the driver, PCM must produce evidence identifying that person as the driver. Simply knowing who the registered keeper is proves nothing about who was behind the wheel on a particular day.

That is obvious in the real world. A vehicle may be driven, with the keeper's permission, by a spouse, partner, relative, friend, employee or any other appropriately insured person. The registered keeper recorded by DVLA is not a record of who was driving at any particular time.

PCM's reliance on Elliott v Loake is particularly desperate. Elliott v Loake was a criminal road-traffic prosecution, not a civil claim for an alleged parking contract, and it did not establish any legal presumption that a registered keeper was the driver. The court reached its conclusion because there was actual evidence linking the defendant to the vehicle and undermining his account. It is therefore no authority whatsoever for PCM's extraordinary proposition that "the keeper is assumed to be the driver until proved otherwise".

PCM are attempting to turn a fact-specific criminal case into a fictitious rule of civil liability which simply does not exist. That is not a minor misunderstanding of the law; it is a grossly misleading representation of what the case actually decided. It is precisely the sort of conduct that gives this former-clamping industry its reputation for using legal-sounding boilerplate to intimidate keepers into paying charges they may not owe.

The position is simple: PCM do not know who was driving. They openly admit that the keeper has not identified the driver. They cannot cure that evidential gap by inventing a presumption and then demanding that the keeper disprove it. If they wish to rely on driver liability, they need evidence identifying the driver. If they wish to rely on keeper liability, they must establish compliance with Schedule 4 of PoFA. Elliott v Loake does neither for them.

The particularly ridiculous part is that PCM themselves admit that you have refused to identify the driver. Precisely. They therefore do not know who the driver was. Unless you tell them, and you are under no legal obligation to do so, they have no way of knowing.

That is exactly why Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 exists. It provides a separate statutory route by which a parking company may, if it has fully complied with all the statutory requirements, pursue a keeper without needing to know who was driving.

So PCM need to decide which case they are actually pursuing:

• Driver liability: identify the driver and produce evidence that the keeper was that person; or
  
• Keeper liability under PoFA: demonstrate compliance with Schedule 4.
  

What they cannot do is invent a third option:

"We don't know who was driving, therefore we will simply assume it was you until you prove otherwise."

That is complete and utter nonsense.

And PCM have also conspicuously failed to deal with the actual reason the vehicle was there. This was not somebody simply parking up because it was convenient. The vehicle was there briefly while heavy furniture was being collected from a resident, and there is contemporaneous evidence from that resident specifically saying that the car park could be used to "load and stuff".

That brings Jopson v Homeguard Services Ltd [2016] B9GF0A9E squarely into the discussion. In that residential parking case, heard on appeal by HHJ Harris QC, the court distinguished ordinary parking from the temporary stopping of a vehicle for the purpose of loading or unloading. The judgment specifically recognised that bringing heavy or bulky items to or from residential premises may require a vehicle to stop close to the building and that such activity is not automatically the same thing as "parking" in the ordinary sense.

That is why PCM's response is so feeble. Instead of engaging with Jopson and the factual question of genuine loading/unloading, they quote an industry-code definition saying that a stationary vehicle can be "deemed to be parked". That does not somehow erase the distinction identified by a Circuit Judge in an actual residential parking appeal.

So PCM have managed to dodge both central issues: they do not know who the driver was, yet pretend Elliott v Loake allows them simply to assume it was the keeper; and they have not properly addressed the evidence that the vehicle was present for the genuine loading of heavy furniture, despite Jopson being directly relevant to precisely that sort of residential loading activity.

That is a considerably better basis for the IAS appeal than simply arguing that "it was only ten minutes". You can now use the IAS. I would not pay the £60 simply because PCM rejected their own invoice. Remember, this is still a £100 private parking invoice with a 40% mugs discount, not a £60 fine.

If you are prepared to see it through rather than capitulate merely because PCM said no, I would submit an IAS appeal concentrating on the genuine loading/unloading, the resident's evidence, the signage/contractual terms and PCM's misuse of Elliott v Loake. An IAS rejection would not make the £100 legally owed; ultimately PCM would still have to prove its case if it chose to pursue it through court.

Before I draft the IAS appeal, though, please post photographs of the actual signs at the site, particularly the entrance sign and the "Permit Holders Only" terms sign. Those could materially affect how I would frame it.

Thanks b789! 

Yeah I thought that it was a shocking response on their part - particularly the insane 'we will assume you are the driver'. No idea how these cowboys think that will work. 

I cycled over to the location that they have listed on their ticket - please see attached images of the entrance and the signage. There were a lot of signs, so these were just the most prominent examples.







https://ibb.co/PSPYX6h
https://ibb.co/27HsWzS7
https://ibb.co/QFYQYGXX
https://ibb.co/rKWR5TJD


I have decided that I will appeal, as it seems as though I have a genuinely strong case, and their appeal rejection was so weak. 

Kind regards,

[KHarHar]

Also apologies for the delay in getting back to you!

Some life things got in the way, and I wasn’t back in that area to photograph it properly (Google maps outdated too).

Really appreciate your help fighting these cowboys!

[b789]

Good... here is a draft IAS appeal you can use. You will not be able to copy and paste it into their webform because they are devious enough to block that, simply to make it as frustrating as possible to actually make a valid appeal. However, you will be able to upload the appeal as a PDF attachment, which you should do and simply note in the webform that the appeal is attached.

Remember that you must NOT select any option that identifies the driver. You are appealing solely as the Keeper. If necessary, select "other" if there is no clear option.

I appeal as the registered keeper.

The driver has not been identified. I am under no legal obligation to identify the driver to a private parking company and I will not be doing so.

The Parking Charge is denied. PCM is put to strict proof of every element necessary to establish liability, including the existence and scope of any contractual term allegedly breached, its authority from the landowner, the treatment of loading/unloading at this residential site, and compliance with Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA) if it seeks to recover the charge from the keeper.

1. The vehicle was engaged in genuine loading activity, not ordinary parking

The vehicle attended the residential premises for the specific purpose of collecting heavy furniture from a resident.

The resident had expressly informed the driver beforehand that the car park could be used to "load and stuff". That contemporaneous communication is evidence both of the purpose of the visit and of the resident's understanding that the area could be used for loading.

The vehicle remained on site only for the short period necessary to attend the resident's property, collect the furniture, load it into the vehicle and leave.

PCM has attempted to characterise that activity as ordinary permit-controlled parking. That is not the factual position and it fails properly to engage with the established distinction between parking and loading/unloading.

2. Jopson v Homeguard is directly relevant

The persuasive County Court appeal authority of Jopson v Homeguard Services Ltd, Oxford County Court, case B9GF0A9E, 29 June 2016, HHJ Harris QC is directly relevant.

At paragraph 19, HHJ Harris QC distinguished between ordinary parking and a temporary stop necessary for loading or unloading, expressly referring to the unloading of heavy or awkward items. At paragraph 20, the Judge explained that the concept of parking involves leaving a vehicle for longer than is reasonably required for getting in or out or for loading/unloading. At paragraph 21, the Judge expressly recognised that a vehicle stopped while an awkward item of furniture was being unloaded was not thereby "parked".

The factual analogy here is obvious. The vehicle was present for the brief and specific purpose of collecting and loading heavy furniture from a resident.

PCM's rejection does not grapple with Jopson at all. Instead it quotes the generic definition of "parked" from the Private Parking Sector Single Code of Practice and asserts that a stationary vehicle can be regarded as parked.

That entirely misses the point.

The issue is not whether the vehicle became stationary. It plainly had to become stationary in order for furniture to be loaded into it. The issue is whether the temporary stopping necessary for genuine loading constituted the contractual parking activity prohibited by PCM's signage.

Jopson demonstrates why those concepts are not interchangeable.

3. PCM's own signage does not prohibit loading or unloading

The principal contractual sign states:

"Vehicles must be registered for a valid virtual bay corresponding resident permit and be parked wholly within the confines of the allocated numbered bay at all times."

It then states:

"Breach of any term or condition will result in the driver being liable for a PARKING CHARGE of £100."

The sign does not state:

• "No loading";
  
• "No unloading";
  
• "No stopping";
  
• that deliveries or collections are prohibited;
  
• that visitors attending residents may not stop temporarily for loading; or
  
• that a resident cannot permit a visitor to access the premises for the purpose of loading or unloading.
  

PCM drafted the contractual wording. It chose to regulate parking.

It cannot retrospectively convert a permit-parking restriction into an absolute prohibition on every temporary stop, collection, delivery or loading operation when its sign contains no such term.

4. The PPSCoP specifically requires landowner arrangements to address loading/unloading and deliveries

This point is particularly important because the current Private Parking Sector Single Code of Practice, version 1.1, specifically addresses the operator's relationship with the landowner.

Clause 14.1(e) requires written confirmation from the landowner before a parking charge can be issued and requires that confirmation to cover, among other matters:

"the parking terms and conditions that are to be applied by the parking operator, including as appropriate ... specific permissions and exemptions, e.g. for staff, residents or those stopping for short periods such as taxi and minicab drivers, delivery drivers and couriers".

That is already directly relevant to this case because the vehicle was present for a short residential collection/loading activity.

The point is reinforced further by Annex G], the Code's sample landowner/operator notice. Paragraph G.3 – Appointment of the operator expressly provides that the landowner confirms that it has considered with the operator:

"Arrangements and exemptions for loading/unloading and deliveries".

This is not an incidental point. The joint BPA/IPC Code expressly contemplates that loading/unloading and delivery arrangements must be considered as part of the site management scheme.

PCM is therefore put to strict proof of:

1. the contemporaneous written landowner authority for this site;
2. the provisions dealing with loading and unloading;
3. the provisions dealing with deliveries and collections;
4. the treatment of visitors attending residents for those purposes;
5. any exemptions or permissions applicable to short-duration loading activity; and
6. PCM's authority, if any, to impose a £100 contractual charge upon a vehicle engaged in genuine loading activity.

A generic statement that PCM is "authorised to operate" is insufficient. The relevant question is what the landowner actually authorised PCM to enforce in relation to loading/unloading at this residential site.

The Code itself says that the landowner/operator arrangements should address precisely this issue.

5. PCM's own rejection does not establish a parking contravention

PCM states:

"You claim to be 'stopped' opposed to 'parked'. This is not accepted."

That is not reasoning. It is merely assertion.

PCM then relies upon the Code definition that a vehicle may be "deemed to be parked" while stationary.

But a trade-association definition cannot be read in isolation from:

• the actual contractual wording on PCM's signs;
  
• the factual purpose for which the vehicle stopped;
  
• the loading/unloading distinction recognised in Jopson; and
  
• the Code's own express requirement that landowner/operator arrangements consider loading/unloading and deliveries.
  

PCM cannot simply label the vehicle "parked" and thereby avoid addressing those matters.

6. ANPR entry and exit times do not establish the alleged parking period or the nature of the activity

PCM relies upon ANPR timestamps showing entry and exit.

Those images establish only that the vehicle passed the cameras at particular times.

They do not establish:

• when the vehicle first became stationary;
  
• where it became stationary;
  
• how long it was stationary;
  
• whether it was stationary continuously;
  
• how much time was spent manoeuvring;
  
• how much time was spent entering or leaving the site; or
  
• what activity occurred while the vehicle was present.
  

Most importantly, ANPR does not show whether the vehicle was being used for loading/unloading.

The evidence supplied by the appellant gives the explanation for the short visit: the vehicle attended for the collection of heavy furniture from a resident and left once that activity was completed.

PCM's ANPR evidence does not contradict that evidence.

7. PCM's reliance upon Elliott v Loake is legally misconceived

PCM's rejection states:

"It can be assumed until proved otherwise, that the keeper of the vehicle is the driver."

It then states:

"the case of Eliot v Loake [sic] makes it clear that in the absence of sufficient evidence to the contrary the keeper is assumed to be the driver."

That proposition is wrong.

There is no general legal presumption that the registered keeper of a vehicle was the driver on a particular occasion.

The driver has not been identified.

The registered keeper is under no legal obligation to identify the driver to PCM.

PCM cannot reverse the evidential position and require the keeper to prove who was driving, prove that somebody else was driving, or otherwise disprove an allegation which PCM itself is unable to substantiate.

8. Elliott v Loake does not create a keeper-equals-driver presumption

Elliott v Loake [1983] Crim LR 36 was a criminal road-traffic prosecution.

It was not a private parking contractual claim and it did not establish any rule that a registered keeper is presumed to have been the driver unless the keeper proves otherwise.

The conclusion in that case depended upon actual evidence linking the defendant to the vehicle and contradicting the account he had given.

PCM has no equivalent evidence here.

Its proposition amounts to this:

"We do not know who was driving, therefore we shall assume it was the keeper unless the keeper proves otherwise."

That is not a principle established by Elliott v Loake and it is not the law governing private parking claims.

9. Schedule 4 PoFA exists precisely because the driver may be unidentified

PCM's own rejection acknowledges that the driver has not been named.

That is precisely why Schedule 4 PoFA contains a separate statutory mechanism by which, in defined circumstances and subject to strict statutory conditions, a parking creditor may seek recovery from a vehicle's keeper even though the driver has not been identified.

If the law already presumed that the registered keeper was the driver unless proved otherwise, the statutory keeper-liability mechanism would serve no purpose.

PCM therefore has two legitimate routes:

• establish liability against an identified driver; or
  
• establish a statutory entitlement to pursue the keeper under Schedule 4 PoFA.
  

What it cannot do is invent a third route based upon a fictitious presumption that an unidentified driver must have been the registered keeper.

10. PCM's own signage attributes contractual liability to "the driver"

PCM's sign expressly states:

"Breach of any term or condition will result in the driver being liable for a PARKING CHARGE of £100."

That is PCM's own formulation of the alleged contractual liability.

The driver has not been identified.

The sign itself therefore does not establish contractual liability against the registered keeper.

Any liability against the keeper must arise, if at all, through Schedule 4 PoFA and only if PCM establishes compliance with every applicable statutory requirement.

Its misuse of Elliott v Loake cannot fill any evidential or statutory gap.

11. PCM has failed to establish that the activity fell within the restriction it seeks to enforce

PCM's case appears to reduce to the proposition that:

• the vehicle entered permit-controlled land;
  
• it remained there briefly;
  
• it did not have a virtual permit;
  
• therefore £100 is payable.
  

That analysis ignores the actual contractual issue.

The appellant's evidence is that the vehicle was present for a short residential loading operation involving heavy furniture.

PCM's signs regulate parking. They do not expressly prohibit loading or unloading.

Jopson distinguishes temporary loading from ordinary parking.

The PPSCoP itself requires landowner/operator arrangements to consider "arrangements and exemptions for loading/unloading and deliveries", and clause 14.1(e) expressly requires written landowner authority to address appropriate permissions and exemptions for persons stopping for short periods, including delivery drivers and couriers.

PCM has therefore not established merely by producing ANPR timestamps and permit signage that this loading activity constituted the alleged contractual breach.

12. Conclusion

The Parking Charge should be cancelled.

The evidence establishes a short visit for the genuine purpose of collecting and loading heavy furniture from a resident.

PCM has failed properly to address:

1. the distinction between parking and loading recognised in Jopson v Homeguard;
2. the absence of any express prohibition on loading/unloading in its signage;
3. the resident's contemporaneous evidence concerning use of the car park for loading;
4. the limitations of ANPR evidence;
5. the requirements of PPSCoP clause 14.1 regarding site-specific permissions and exemptions;
6. the express requirement in Annex G.3 that landowner/operator arrangements consider "arrangements and exemptions for loading/unloading and deliveries";
7. the fact that the driver has not been identified;
8. the absence of any legal obligation upon the keeper to identify the driver; and
9. its legally misconceived attempt to use Elliott v Loake to manufacture a presumption that the keeper was the driver.

If PCM contests this appeal, the appellant requests that it produce the full contemporaneous landowner authority relevant to the date of the alleged event, including the site-specific provisions concerning loading, unloading, deliveries, collections, resident visitors and short-duration stopping, together with the evidence upon which it contends that the brief activity in this case constituted chargeable parking rather than genuine loading.