3 private parking tickets being pursued for all 3 and had a ccj claim made

[Barbudaprince]

Hi Carrying this case (https://www.ftla.uk/private-parking-tick...#msg111411)  over from FTLA as not had much response over there. How does this look as a witness statement?  Need to submit by 6th March 2026. 

Any comments and recommended amends greatly appreciated - https://docs.google.com/document/d/1D9MD...ue&sd=true

[b789]

Welcome to the forum @Barbudaprince.

I have had a quick review the second draft of your witness statement and the tenancy agreement wording you have relied upon.

At this stage, I want to focus purely on what you have shown me, rather than the wider case background.

First, in relation to the tenancy and the alleged “right to park”.

Clause 4.15 of your tenancy regulates parking. It does not, on its face, grant an unfettered or exclusive right to park. It sets conditions. It prohibits parking except where there is a garage, parking space, or driveway with hardstanding and a dropped kerb. It also states that where a parking scheme is in operation, a valid permit must be displayed.

That is important. The clause is regulatory rather than proprietary. It does not expressly grant you a demised parking space. It does not state that no third-party enforcement may apply. It does not exclude the possibility of a permit scheme. In fact, it anticipates one.

Your current draft overstates the strength of the primacy argument. Saying that the tenancy “overrides” signage or that no enforcement power exists is stronger than the wording itself supports. The lease does not grant the Claimant enforcement rights, but equally it does not grant you an unconditional right to park without compliance with a scheme.

This does not mean the argument fails. It means it must be framed carefully and factually. The strength of the residential defence will depend on matters such as whether a specific bay was allocated to you, whether the scheme was introduced after your tenancy began, whether there was any formal variation, and how the site is physically arranged. Those facts matter more than abstract statements about primacy.

Second, the structure of the document.

As drafted, this reads far more like an expanded defence or skeleton argument than a witness statement.

A witness statement should set out facts within your knowledge. It should explain what happened. It should identify documents you rely upon. It should avoid legal argument and rhetorical questions.

Your draft repeatedly moves into advocacy. It makes CPR strike-out submissions. It asserts that the claim should be struck out. It argues abuse of process. It challenges mediation conduct. It includes rhetorical questions about contract formation. It repeats conclusions such as “therefore the alleged contraventions did not occur”.

Those are submissions. They belong in a skeleton argument or at the hearing. They should not dominate a witness statement.

Judges in small claims prefer clear, factual, first-person evidence. When a witness statement reads like argument, the risk is that it is skimmed or mentally discounted as advocacy.

At this stage, my advice based solely on what you have shown me is:

The tenancy argument needs to be recalibrated to reflect what the wording actually says.

The witness statement needs to be rewritten in a factual, first-person structure, with legal conclusions stripped back.

The legal points on PoFA, keeper liability, vague Particulars of Claim and added costs can remain in play, but they need to be expressed as factual observations rather than procedural submissions.

I will now review the case in full once you provide the relevant facts, the Particulars of Claim and the defence as filed. After that, I will give you more detailed advice and assist with a properly structured witness statement.

I will revert within 24 hours once I have had the opportunity to assess the matter in full.

In the meantime, to assist me in getting all the facts consolidated in one place for easy reference, could you please complete the PCN details form here and paste the summary as a reply to this thread:

https://gullibletree.com/tools/pcnform_main.html

Have you received the claimants WS? If so, please can you also provide a link to it.

[Barbudaprince]

Hi and thanks for the welcome.

This case concerns a Parking Charge Notice (private parking firm) issued by UK Car Park Management Ltd, relating to an alleged contravention on Tuesday, 06 May 1924. The notice itself is dated an unspecified date, and I first became aware of it via received initial notice.

The notice appears to have been issued as By post (ANPR/camera). Driver identified status: NO. Equality Act considerations: No. The location is stated as Wheatstone House, 650-654 Chiswick High Road, Chiswick, W4 5BB.

A preliminary Protection of Freedoms Act (PoFA) assessment indicates PENDING: Enter the notice issue date to calculate deemed delivery and timing. Route applied: Not specified. The notice is treated as given on Not available.

Current stage:
- Notice responded to: No
- Debt recovery letters: Yes
- Letter of Claim: Yes
- County Court claim: Yes
- Letter of Claim responded to: No
- Letter of Claim source: Bulk litigation firm
- Letter of Claim firm: BW Legal

County Court claim deadlines: issue date Saturday, 18 July 1925, deemed service Thursday, 23 July 1925, AoS deadline 4pm Thursday, 06 August 1925, defence deadline without AoS 4pm Thursday, 06 August 1925, and defence deadline with AoS 4pm Thursday, 20 August 1925.

Additional notes provided:
The form didn't allow me to enter the year - but for the first question regarding the 3 PCN dates they are:

30/04/2024
04/05/2024
11/05/2024                                                                               

The second question regarding when the CCJ Claim was issued is 18/07/2025.

Please can I have advice on the strongest next steps and defence points for this case. 


Haven't recieved the Claimant's witness statement as yet.

Particulars of claim is here:https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1bTsCiAMpC16uGvrcU9lo5Syz3ifpqeku?usp=drive_link 

My acknowledgement of service was submitted on@ 28/07/2025 to MCOL.

My defence was:

1. The Defendant denies the claim in full. No contract was
formed, no breach occurred, and no debt is owed. The claim is
legally and procedurally deficient.

2. The Defendant is a leaseholder with a pre-existing right to
park under Clause 4.15 of the lease. This clause governs parking
and does not authorise third-party enforcement or delegate
rights to the Claimant.

3. The lease takes precedence. No separate contract could
arise from signage where parking is already regulated by lease.
The Claimant’s assertion of a contractual licence is legally
flawed.

4. The Particulars of Claim (PoC) fail to comply with CPR 16.4
and PD 16.7.3(1). The Claimant has not quoted or exhibited the
alleged contractual terms, nor identified any specific breach.

5. The PoC do not specify whether the Defendant is pursued as
driver or keeper. This ambiguity renders the claim incoherent
and procedurally improper.

6. The alleged contraventions (“Permit Required”, “No Parking on
Access Roads”, etc.) are bare assertions. No evidence is
provided of signage, terms, or acceptance.

7. The claimed sum of £510 is unexplained. No breakdown,
calculation, or legal basis is given for the charges or “debt
recovery costs.”

8. The PoC are vague, unsupported, and legally incoherent. The
claim should be struck out under CPR 3.4(2)(a) as disclosing no
reasonable grounds.

9. The Defendant submits that the claim is so vague and
procedurally deficient that it fails to disclose any reasonable
grounds. The PoC breach CPR 16.4 and PD 16.7.3(1), and no
legally recognisable cause of action is pleaded. Given the
modest value and disproportionate use of court resources, the
Defendant invites the court to strike out the claim under CPR
3.4(2)(a) rather than permit amendment. The following Draft
Order is proposed:

Draft Order:

Of the Court's own initiative and upon reading the particulars
of claim and the defence.

AND the court being of the view that the Particulars of Claim,
though served separately, remain deficient and do not comply
with CPR 16.4(1)(a) and PD 16.7.3(1), because:

(a) They do not set out the exact wording of the clause(s) of
the terms and conditions relied upon; and

(b) They do not adequately set out the reason(s) why the
Claimant asserts that the Defendant was in breach of contract.

AND upon the claim being for a modest sum, such that the court
considers it disproportionate and contrary to the overriding
objective to allocate further resources by ordering amended
pleadings and further case management.

ORDER:
1. The claim is struck out.
2. Permission to either party to apply to set aside, vary or
stay this order by application on notice, which must be filed at
this Court not more than 5 days after service of this order,
failing which no such application may be made.

[b789]

If the claimant has not yet submitted their WS, you cannot fully state your case in your WS. I suggest you open your WS with a preliminary statement as follows:

PRELIMINARY MATTER: DEFECTIVE PARTICULARS OF CLAIM

1. Before addressing the factual allegations made against me, I raise a preliminary issue concerning the adequacy of the Particulars of Claim.

2. The Claimant asserts a cause of action in contract. However, the Particulars of Claim do not state whether the alleged contract is said to be written, oral, or formed by conduct.

3. The Particulars of Claim do not identify the date of any alleged contract, do not set out the contractual terms relied upon, do not identify the clause said to have been breached, and do not explain how the sum claimed is calculated by reference to any contractual provision.

4. CPR 16.4(1)(a) requires a claimant to include a concise statement of the facts on which the claimant relies.

5. Practice Direction 16 paragraph 7.3 further requires that where a claim is based on a written agreement, a copy must be attached or the relevant terms must be set out in the Particulars of Claim; and where a claim is based on an oral agreement, the words spoken, by whom, to whom, and when must be pleaded.

6. In Liberty Homes (Kent) Ltd v Rajakanthan & Ors [2022] EWHC 2201 (TCC), Mrs Justice Jefford DBE considered materially similar deficiencies. At paragraph 106, the Court held that where the matters required by the Practice Direction are missing, the pleading “does not provide a concise statement of the claimant’s claim in accordance with the rules” and should be struck out.

7. At paragraph 108, the Court further held that where a pleading fails to identify a proper contractual basis, it discloses “no reasonable grounds for bringing the claim”.

8. I understand Liberty Homes to be a High Court decision and therefore binding authority. In my view, the deficiencies identified in paragraphs 106–108 of that judgment apply directly to the present case.

9. The absence of pleaded contractual terms prevents me from properly understanding the contractual case I am required to meet and prevents the Court from identifying the legal foundation of the claim.

10. I therefore respectfully raise this as a preliminary matter for the Court’s consideration before turning to the substantive factual issues.

SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE TO THE CLAIM

11. I am the Defendant in this matter and at all material times I was the lawful tenant of Wheatstone House, 650–654 Chiswick High Road, W4 5BB, under a fixed term assured shorthold tenancy granted by London and Quadrant Housing Trust (Exhibit 5).

12. Clause 4.15 of my tenancy agreement regulates vehicles and parking. It expressly governs where vehicles may be parked on land owned by the landlord.

13. The tenancy agreement grants me a pre-existing right to park. That right does not arise from signage and is not conditional upon entering into any contract with a third party parking operator.

14. Clause 4.15.1 permits parking in a parking bay and on a driveway with hardstanding and a dropped kerb. On the dates of the alleged contraventions, the vehicle was positioned either in a parking bay or on a driveway with hardstanding and a dropped kerb, consistent with my tenancy rights.

15. There is no provision within my tenancy agreement granting the Claimant authority to issue parking charges to me as tenant, nor any clause permitting the landlord to delegate enforcement rights that would override or derogate from the tenancy.

16. I did not enter into any contract with the Claimant. I already held a lawful right to park. I had no reason to read, consider or accept any alleged contractual offer from the Claimant.

17. The signage relied upon by the Claimant is vague and prohibitive in nature. It refers to “access roads” and “roadways” without clearly defining those areas and without explaining how such wording interacts with residents’ tenancy rights.

18. I did not accept any contractual offer from the Claimant, and I did not intend to create any legal relationship with them.

19. The Parking Charge Notices record only single timestamps. They do not specify any defined period of parking.

20. Schedule 4 paragraph 9(2)(a) of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 requires a Notice to Keeper to “specify the vehicle, the relevant land on which it was parked and the period of parking to which the notice relates.” The statutory requirement is for a period, not a moment in time.

21. In Brennan v PPS (2024), the court confirmed that recording a single instant is insufficient. The judge made clear that without identification of a period of parking, it cannot be determined whether the vehicle was present only briefly, for example while the driver was considering the terms before deciding whether to remain. A single timestamp does not demonstrate any period of parking.

22. The Claimant’s notices do not identify any period of parking. They therefore fail to comply with paragraph 9(2)(a), and keeper liability cannot arise.

23. I have never identified the driver. There is no legal obligation upon a registered keeper to do so.

24. The Claimant has asserted in correspondence that it may rely upon a “reasonable assumption” that the registered keeper was the driver.

25. In VCS Ltd v Edward (2023) [HOKF6C9C], HHJ Gargan held at paragraph 35.3 that no inference can properly be drawn from keeper status alone and that it is for the claimant to prove, by evidence, that the defendant was the driver. Keeper status is not evidence of driving.

26. The Claimant has produced no evidence identifying me as the driver. Driver liability is therefore denied.

27. The Parking Charge Notices state the location as “Wheatstone House, 650 Chiswick High Road, W4 5SA.” My tenancy agreement clearly identifies the property as “Wheatstone House, 650–654 Chiswick High Road, W4 5BB” (Exhibit 5).

28. The Particulars of Claim refer only to “Wheatstone House, London,” without specifying the full and correct address. That description is ambiguous and does not clearly identify the relevant land.

29. The inconsistencies in the address details bring into question whether the Claimant has properly identified the land on which the alleged contraventions are said to have occurred, and whether Schedule 4 has been complied with.

30. The sum claimed includes additional “debt recovery” costs. No contractual term has been identified permitting recovery of those sums, and no calculation is set out in the Particulars of Claim.

31. I deny that any enforceable contract was formed with the Claimant, deny that any tenancy term was breached, deny that keeper liability has been established, and deny that the Claimant is entitled to the sums claimed or any sum at all.

32. I respectfully request that the Court dismiss the claim.

This now reads:

• Procedural strike-out (Liberty Homes)
  
• Tenancy primacy
  
• No contract
  
• PoFA period failure (Brennan)
  
• No driver inference (Edward)
  
• Land identification defect
  
• Unlawful add-ons
  
• Clean conclusion
  

Don't forget to include the necessary court header and the Statement of Truth (SoT). Check for exhibits and reference them properly in the WS. I've linked to the relevant transcripts referenced.

If you receive the claimants WS before the deadline on 6th March, let us know. Do not submit your WS bundle until the deadline and remember to CC in the Claimants solicitors.

[Barbudaprince]

So just received the evidence from the claimant in the post: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1...drive_link

things i've noted:

the terms and conditions in UKCPM Ltd with the freeholder say the term runs for 12 months from "go live date", which is in 2021. The term of the agreement is redacted so I am concerned that UKCPM don't have a "live" agreement regulating their enforcement at the carpark.

The agreement is not signed with wet ink - seems to be typed in.

They have provided timestamp pics showing a period of parking had occurred by the driver. this is typically around 10 minutes for each PCN.

They have used the the defendant not providing a lease agreement showing they have a right to park there.

Given they have provided this pack, can i assume they will be taking this case to the hearing? I will be out of country from 10th until 4th April, will i likely receive any correspondence that will require actioning over that period?

[b789]

Let me review their evidence and I will get back to you later today, probably with a revised WS you can submit.

This is issued by BW Legal who almost always go all the way to a hearing. Regarding dates, you have the hearing date notified on the same document that gives you the deadline for WS submission. Are you saying you will not be available for the hearing date?

[b789]

@Barbudaprince, what is the date you signed your lease for the property?

[Barbudaprince]

Signed the lease around march 2022. I will be able to attend hearing which is for late April 2026. It is the interim period when I will be out of country.

Appreciate you taking the time to help.

[b789]

In light of the claimants WS, I have drafted a revised WS for you to consider:

1. I am the Defendant in this matter. The facts and matters set out in this witness statement are within my own knowledge except where stated otherwise. Where facts are not within my direct knowledge they are true to the best of my information and belief.

PRELIMINARY MATTER: DEFECTIVE PARTICULARS OF CLAIM

2. Before addressing the factual allegations made against me, I raise a preliminary issue concerning the adequacy of the Particulars of Claim.

3. The Claimant asserts a cause of action in contract. However, the Particulars of Claim do not state whether the alleged contract is written, oral, or formed by conduct. The Particulars of Claim do not identify the contractual terms relied upon, do not identify the clause said to have been breached, and do not explain how the sum claimed is calculated by reference to any contractual provision.

4. CPR 16.4(1)(a) requires a claimant to include a concise statement of the facts on which the claimant relies. Practice Direction 16, paragraph 7.3, further provides that where a claim is based upon a contract the claimant must specify the contractual terms relied upon and identify how those terms were allegedly breached.

5. The Particulars of Claim fail to comply with those requirements. They provide only a generic assertion that a parking charge became payable but do not identify the alleged contract, the wording of any term relied upon, or the conduct said to constitute acceptance of any such term.

6. Instead, the Claimant attempts to introduce the alleged contractual terms for the first time through the witness statement of its legal representative.

7. In Liberty Homes (Kent) Limited v Rajakanthan & Others [2022] EWHC 2201 (TCC), a transcript of which is exhibited at XX-01, Mrs Justice Jefford DBE described pleadings that failed to properly identify the agreement relied upon as “deeply unsatisfactory”, noting that the claimant in that case had failed even to identify whether the agreement relied upon was oral or written (paragraph 35).

8. The same defect arises in this case. The Particulars of Claim do not identify the alleged contractual terms relied upon, nor the conduct said to constitute acceptance of those terms. Instead, the Claimant attempts to introduce those matters only at the witness statement stage.

9. I therefore submit that the Claimant’s witness evidence attempts to supply material facts which were never pleaded, contrary to the requirement that pleadings define the case the Defendant must meet.

10. For that reason, the Claimant’s case as now advanced in the witness statement goes materially beyond the pleaded case contained in the Particulars of Claim.

THE CLAIMANT’S WITNESS EVIDENCE

11. The Claimant’s witness statement has been produced by Ms Nabeela Ahmed, who describes herself as a paralegal employed by BW Legal Services Limited.

12. Ms Ahmed states that the matters referred to in her statement are either within her own knowledge or based upon information provided to her by the Claimant.

13. Ms Ahmed is not an employee of the Claimant and has no direct involvement in the management of the site, the erection or maintenance of signage, the alleged parking event, or the issuing of the parking charge.

14. Ms Ahmed does not claim to have attended the site, to have witnessed the alleged event, or to possess any first-hand knowledge of the matters asserted in the statement.

15. Instead, the statement relies largely upon information provided to BW Legal by the Claimant.

16. The statement therefore consists primarily of hearsay evidence from a legal representative who has no direct involvement in the matters alleged.

17. The Claimant’s evidence bundle includes photographs which appear to have been taken by a parking attendant at the site.

18. The individual who took those photographs would be the only person capable of providing first-hand evidence of the circumstances in which they were taken and the conditions present at the time.

19. Despite this, no witness statement has been provided from that individual.

20. Instead, the Claimant relies upon the statement of Ms Nabeela Ahmed, a paralegal employed by BW Legal Services Limited, who confirms that much of her evidence is based upon information supplied by the Claimant.

21. Ms Ahmed does not claim to have attended the site, to have witnessed the alleged event, or to have any personal knowledge of the matters asserted in her statement.

22. I therefore understand that the Claimant has chosen not to provide evidence from the only person with direct knowledge of the alleged event and instead relies upon second-hand information relayed through its legal representative.

SIGNAGE AND THE ABSENCE OF ANY CONTRACTUAL OFFER

23. I have reviewed the wording of the signage relied upon by the Claimant. A close-up photograph of the terms sign is exhibited at XX-02.

24. The sign contains the following prominent instructions:

• “A VALID UK CPM PERMIT MUST BE CLEARLY DISPLAYED IN THE FRONT WINDSCREEN AT ALL TIMES.”
  
• “Vehicles displaying bay or area allocated permits must park in the corresponding bay or area.”
  
• “NO PARKING ON ACCESS ROADS / ROADWAYS.”
  
• “If unsure please seek further advice from CPM or refrain from parking.”
  

25. In my understanding, when these terms are read together the sign does not communicate any contractual offer to park to members of the public generally. Instead, it communicates a restricted licence permitting parking only for vehicles displaying a valid permit and only within the appropriate designated bay or area.

26. The sign expressly states that parking on access roads or roadways is not permitted. That wording is plainly prohibitive. It does not offer parking in those areas on any contractual basis.

27. In my understanding, a prohibition is not capable of forming a contractual offer. A driver cannot accept an offer that does not exist. The dominant message of the sign is therefore that parking is not allowed in those locations rather than that parking is permitted in exchange for a payment.

28. The additional instruction “If unsure please seek further advice from CPM or refrain from parking” reinforces that interpretation. In my understanding this wording instructs motorists who are not certain that they are authorised to park to refrain from parking altogether, rather than suggesting that they may park and incur a contractual charge.

29. The signage therefore reads as a conditional licence granted only to authorised permit holders parking within designated bays or areas. It does not communicate any contractual offer to park on access roads or roadways.

30. The Claimant relies on a small-print clause stating that a driver may become liable for £100 for breach of the terms. However, I understand that such wording is framed as a consequence of breach rather than as the price of parking. The £100 charge is not presented as a core term permitting parking but as a sanction for conduct the sign itself prohibits.

31. In those circumstances, I understand that the signage communicates prohibition and exclusion rather than a contractual bargain. If parking on the roadway is not permitted at all, then no contractual licence to park there can arise.

32. I therefore do not understand how any contract capable of acceptance by a driver could arise in the circumstances alleged by the Claimant.

SIGNAGE – VISIBILITY AND INCORPORATION OF TERMS

33. I have also considered the physical characteristics of the signage relied upon by the Claimant.

34. The terms signs are mounted at a considerable height, approximately 10 feet above ground level, on poles and walls around the site. From ground level the text appears extremely small and dense.

35. In my understanding, a driver would be required to leave their vehicle and stand directly beneath the sign in order to attempt to read the detailed wording.

36. The majority of the wording on the sign, including the clause stating that a driver may become liable for a charge of £100, appears in very small font within a large block of text.

37. From a normal standing position on the ground the detailed wording of the sign is extremely difficult to read. In my understanding it would not be possible for a driver to read and understand the detailed contractual wording from a vehicle before deciding whether to remain on the land.

38. In particular, the £100 charge relied upon by the Claimant is not prominently displayed but appears within the small print of the sign.

39. In my understanding, if a contractual charge is to be relied upon, the term imposing that charge must be clearly and prominently brought to the attention of the driver before any alleged contract is formed.

40. The Supreme Court in ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67 placed particular emphasis on the prominence and clarity of the parking charge displayed on the signage in that case. A comparison between the signage considered by the Supreme Court in Beavis and the signage relied upon by the Claimant in this case is exhibited at XX-03. That comparison demonstrates that in Beavis the parking charge was displayed in large and prominent lettering forming a central and conspicuous feature of the sign, whereas on the Claimant’s signage the alleged £100 charge appears only within dense small print.

41. The comparison also illustrates the principle described by Lord Denning MR in J Spurling Ltd v Bradshaw [1956] 1 WLR 461, commonly referred to as the “Red Hand Rule”, that the more onerous a contractual term is, the greater the degree of prominence required to bring it fairly to a party’s attention. In this case the physical positioning of the signs and the minuscule font size of the detailed wording mean that the alleged £100 term could not reasonably be read or understood by a driver at the material time, and I therefore do not understand how the Claimant can establish that the alleged contractual charge was properly communicated or incorporated into any contract with a driver.

SIGNAGE – CLAIMANT’S RELIANCE ON PARKINGEYE LTD v BEAVIS

42. In paragraph 8 of the Claimant’s witness statement, Ms Ahmed relies upon the authority of ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67 in support of the enforceability of the parking charge.

43. Ms Ahmed states that the Supreme Court accepted that a parking charge of £85 was reasonable and that such charges serve a legitimate interest in deterring motorists from breaching the terms and conditions.

44. However, in my understanding the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Beavis was based upon a number of specific factual features present in that case, including the clear and prominent display of the parking charge on the signage and the commercial context of a free customer car park at a retail site where a two-hour parking limit was imposed in order to ensure turnover of spaces for the benefit of retail customers.

45. I have reviewed the signage considered by the Supreme Court in Beavis and have exhibited at XX-04 a comparison between that signage and the signage relied upon by the Claimant in this case.

46. The comparison demonstrates that the charge in Beavis was displayed prominently in large and conspicuous lettering forming a central feature of the sign, whereas the charge relied upon by the Claimant appears only in small print within a dense block of text.

47. In my understanding the circumstances in the present case are materially different from those considered by the Supreme Court in Beavis. This case concerns a residential car park subject to a permit scheme rather than a free retail car park intended to encourage turnover of spaces for customers.

48. For those reasons, I do not understand how the Claimant can rely upon the authority of Beavis when both the signage and the underlying factual context differ materially from the circumstances considered by the Supreme Court in that case.

EVIDENCE OF THE ALLEGED CONTRAVENTION

51. The Claimant relies upon a series of photographs which are said to have been taken by a parking attendant at the location.

52. Those photographs appear to form the entirety of the Claimant’s evidence of the alleged contravention.

53. However, the Claimant has not provided any witness statement from the individual who actually attended the site and took those photographs.

54. Instead, the Claimant relies upon a witness statement from a paralegal employed by its legal representatives, BW Legal Services Limited.

55. That individual was not present at the location and has no first-hand knowledge of the events alleged.

56. In my understanding, the only person capable of giving direct evidence of the circumstances in which the photographs were taken would be the parking attendant who attended the site.

57. No such evidence has been produced.

58. As a result, the Claimant’s evidence as to the alleged contravention consists solely of photographs exhibited through the statement of a legal representative who was not present at the site and who confirms that much of her evidence is based upon information supplied by the Claimant.

59. In my understanding, the Claimant has therefore produced no direct witness evidence from the individual who observed the alleged events and relies only upon photographs presented without any first-hand testimony explaining the circumstances in which they were taken.

NO KEEPER LIABILITY – ABSENCE OF A “PERIOD OF PARKING”

60. The Claimant seeks to hold the registered keeper liable for the parking charge. In order to do so the Claimant must comply strictly with the requirements of Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012.

61. Paragraph 9(2)(a) of Schedule 4 requires a Notice to Keeper to “specify the vehicle, the relevant land on which it was parked and the period of parking to which the notice relates.”

62. I have reviewed the Notice to Keeper relied upon by the Claimant. The notice records only a single observation time rather than identifying any defined period of parking and no start time and end time are provided.

63. In my understanding, a single timestamp cannot constitute a “period of parking” because it does not describe any period at all.

64. This issue was considered in the County Court appeal decision in Brennan v Premier Parking Solutions (2023) [H6DP632H].

65. I exhibit a copy of that judgment at XX-05. In Brennan the appellate judge confirmed that the statutory wording requires the notice to identify a period of parking and that the statutory conditions must be complied with if a parking operator wishes to rely on keeper liability.

66. The judge explained that the period of parking does not need to represent the entire duration that a vehicle was present, but it must nevertheless identify some defined period of time to which the notice relates.

67. In my understanding, the period identified must at least represent a duration sufficient for a driver to read the terms and decide whether to accept them, because a contract cannot be formed instantaneously. The Private Parking Single Code of Practice, which the Claimant is obliged to follow, requires operators to allow a minimum consideration period of at least five minutes before a parking charge may be issued.

68. However, the Notice to Keeper relied upon by the Claimant identifies no period at all and records only a single observation time, meaning the statutory requirement to specify a period of parking has not been satisfied.

69. In those circumstances the Claimant cannot rely on the provisions of Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 to pursue the registered keeper for the parking charge.

70. The driver has not been identified and no evidence has been produced identifying the driver. The Claimant is therefore unable to rely on keeper liability and has no basis upon which to pursue the registered keeper in this claim.

DRIVER IDENTITY – VCS v EDWARD

75. I understand that where a claimant cannot rely upon the statutory keeper liability provisions of Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, the claimant must prove the identity of the driver if it seeks to pursue driver liability. The inability to rely on Schedule 4 does not permit a claimant to assume that the registered keeper was the driver, and the burden of proving the identity of the driver rests with the claimant.

76. This issue was considered in Vehicle Control Services Ltd v Ian Mark Edward (2023)[HOKF6C9C]. I exhibit a copy of the approved transcript of that appeal judgment at Exhibit XX-06.

77. In that judgment the appellate court confirmed that the fact that a person is the registered keeper does not produce any inference that they were driving the vehicle on the material occasion (paragraph 34).

78. In the present case the Claimant has produced no evidence identifying the driver of the vehicle and relies only upon photographs of the vehicle and a witness statement from a BW Legal paralegal who was not present at the site.

79. In those circumstances, and in the absence of compliance with Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, I understand that the Claimant cannot establish liability against me as the registered keeper.

RESIDENTIAL TENANCY AND ABSENCE OF ANY CONTRACT WITH THE CLAIMANT

80. At the material time I was a residential tenant of the property under a written tenancy agreement granted by London and Quadrant Housing Trust (“L&Q”), which is the landholder referred to in the Claimant’s evidence.

81. The Claimant states in its witness statement that it did not have sight of the tenancy agreement when preparing its evidence and proceeds to make assumptions about its contents. In particular, the Claimant speculates that the Defendant has not shown any right to park and suggests that any lease would normally contain rights and restrictions permitting the landlord to introduce a parking scheme. Those assertions are made despite the Claimant expressly acknowledging that it had not seen the tenancy agreement.

82. I have now reviewed the tenancy agreement governing the occupation of the property and exhibit a copy at Exhibit XX-07.

83. The tenancy agreement defines the demised premises as the residential flat only. It does not grant any demised parking space and does not create any contractual relationship between the tenant and any third-party parking enforcement company.

84. The only contractual relationship created by the tenancy agreement is between the tenant and the landlord, L&Q. The tenancy agreement contains provisions relating to vehicles and parking which regulate the conduct of tenants as part of the landlord’s management of the estate. In my understanding those provisions operate as tenancy covenants owed to the landlord.

85. The tenancy agreement does not state that tenants agree to enter into contracts with any parking enforcement company, nor does it state that tenants agree to pay parking charges to any third-party operator.

86. The Claimant is not a party to the tenancy agreement and has no contractual relationship with me arising from that agreement.

87. In my understanding, if a tenant were to breach any tenancy condition relating to vehicles or parking, that would be a matter between the tenant and the landlord under the tenancy agreement.

88. In those circumstances, and in the absence of any contractual agreement between myself and the Claimant, I understand that the Claimant cannot rely upon the tenancy agreement to establish any liability on my part to pay a parking charge to the Claimant.

CONCLUSION

89. For the reasons set out in this witness statement, it is my understanding that the Claimant has failed to establish any lawful basis upon which I may be held liable for the parking charge.

90. The Claimant has not produced any direct evidence from the individual who allegedly observed the vehicle and relies solely upon photographs presented without any supporting first-hand testimony. In addition, the Claimant cannot rely upon the keeper liability provisions of Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 because the Notice to Keeper does not specify any “period of parking” as required by paragraph 9(2)(a). The driver has not been identified and the Claimant has produced no evidence establishing driver identity.

91. The Claimant’s assumptions regarding the Defendant’s tenancy are misplaced. The tenancy agreement establishes a contractual relationship only between the tenant and the landlord and creates no contractual relationship between the Defendant and the Claimant. The Claimant is not a party to that agreement.

92. In addition, the document relied upon by the Claimant to demonstrate its authority to operate at the site does not establish that the Claimant was granted authority by the landholder to issue parking charges or pursue legal proceedings in its own name.

93. In light of the matters set out above, I respectfully submit that the Claimant has failed to establish any contractual liability on my part and that the claim should therefore be dismissed.

You will need to replace the XX in the exhibit references with your initials. You will need to add the court header and the Statement of Truth. Just look at the claimants bundle and see how they have put theirs together. Just follow the same format.

I will also give you a skeleton that you can include later today (I am currently 6 hours west of you). You do not have to submit this until 4pm tomorrow. When you do, you will email a copy to the court and in the same email CC BW Legal.

I have also attached the comparison of their sign with the Beavis sign as referenced. If you want to include some of your own images that you had in your original WS, the by all means do so, especially the ones that show how rubbish their signs are. Just make sure you reference them as exhibits in the WS at the correct place.

   

[Barbudaprince]

Thanks so much @b789 .

Question -  which is probably silly - but some of the other case's transcripts referred to in my WS as exhibits are multiple pages (Liberty Homes vs others is 39) do I need to copy all of this in?

I will send before 4pm today and will copy in BW legal.

Thanks again