Parking Charge for a quick stop!

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That rejection is useful because it exposes the fundamental contradiction in the operator’s case.

The alleged contravention on the Notice to Keeper is a failure to register the vehicle. The rejection now admits that registration had to be completed on a tablet inside reception and that the premises were closed. The operator then attempts to substitute a different allegation: that the driver had “no permission” to use the car park while the premises were closed.

That is not the same alleged breach. Unless the signs clearly and prominently stated that the car park could not be used outside the centre’s opening hours, the operator cannot invent that restriction retrospectively in an appeal rejection. Signage must adequately communicate the relevant terms before any contract can be formed, including in the lighting conditions in which the land may be accessed.

For what it’s worth, you may as well submit this as your IAS (kangaroo court) appeal:

I am the registered keeper of the vehicle. The driver has not been identified, and no admission is made as to the identity of the driver. This appeal concerns the operator’s failure to establish any lawful liability against me as keeper.

The central defect in the operator’s case is exposed by its own rejection letter. The Notice to Keeper alleges “Failure to Register for the Duration of Stay”. However, the rejection states that registration had to be completed “on the tablet within reception” and simultaneously accepts that the premises were closed. The operator then attempts to replace the original allegation with an entirely different proposition, namely that, because the premises were closed, the driver had no permission to use the car park.

Those are not the same alleged contravention. A failure to register presupposes that parking was permitted subject to registration. An allegation that the driver had no permission to park at all is instead an allegation that parking was prohibited while the premises were closed. The operator cannot issue a charge for one alleged breach and then retrospectively justify it by inventing a different contractual restriction after the original allegation has been challenged.

According to the driver, the vehicle entered at approximately 22:47 and remained for approximately 17 minutes. It was dark, the leisure centre was closed, no adequately illuminated or prominent signage was visible, and the driver was unaware of any registration requirement or prohibition on using the car park outside the premises’ opening hours. The operator expressly states that the only registration facility was a tablet situated inside reception. As reception was closed and inaccessible, the operator’s own arrangements made compliance with the alleged registration requirement impossible.

The operator cannot establish a contractual breach by requiring the driver to use equipment situated inside closed premises and then demanding £100 because that inaccessible equipment was not used. This is not mitigation. It goes directly to whether any contractual obligation was adequately communicated, capable of acceptance and capable of performance. A person cannot reasonably be held liable for failing to perform an alleged contractual condition which the other contracting party has made impossible to perform.

The operator may contend that the driver should have left immediately. That argument assumes, without evidence, that the registration requirement or alleged out-of-hours prohibition was clearly visible, adequately illuminated and understood at the material time. According to the driver, no sufficiently prominent, legible or illuminated signage conveyed either restriction. The primary issue is therefore the absence of adequate notice. The impossibility of registration while the premises were closed is a separate and reinforcing failure in the operator’s alleged contractual arrangements.

If the operator now maintains that parking was prohibited whenever the premises were closed, it is put to strict proof that the signage displayed at the material time clearly, prominently and unambiguously stated that precise restriction. A sign requiring visitors to register on a tablet inside reception is not equivalent to a sign stating that parking is prohibited outside opening hours. The operator cannot retrospectively convert one term into the other merely because its registration process was unavailable.

The operator is put to strict proof by contemporaneous evidence that the entrance and contractual signs were positioned, illuminated and legible at approximately 22:47; that they expressly prohibited parking while the premises were closed; that they clearly explained how the driver could register the vehicle when reception was inaccessible; and that the signage complied fully with the applicable Private Parking Sector Code of Practice. Generic daylight photographs, close-up images taken directly in front of a sign, stock photographs or undated site images will not establish what was visible to the driver during darkness at the material time.

The operator must produce a dated site plan identifying every sign, photographs showing the entrance from the driver’s actual approach, the complete wording and dimensions of each material sign, evidence of mounting height and font size, details of any illumination or reflective properties, maintenance and inspection records, and photographs taken in lighting conditions equivalent to those existing at approximately 22:47. It must also prove that any alleged out-of-hours prohibition formed part of the signage at the material time and was not merely introduced later in the rejection letter.

The operator’s rejection also creates an insurmountable contractual contradiction. If parking was permitted subject to registration, the operator made the required method of registration inaccessible. If the driver had no permission to park because the premises were closed, the signage was prohibitory and did not make a contractual offer to park in return for payment of £100. An operator cannot simultaneously assert that no permission whatsoever was offered and that the driver nevertheless accepted a contractual licence carrying a charge for breach.

Where parking is absolutely prohibited, any possible cause of action would ordinarily be in trespass and would lie with the landowner or a person having the necessary proprietary interest. The operator is therefore put to strict proof that it possessed sufficient proprietary rights or an express assignment permitting it to pursue damages for trespass in its own name. It cannot dress an alleged act of unauthorised parking as a contractual charge merely to avoid that difficulty.

Any purported registration or out-of-hours term must also satisfy the Consumer Rights Act 2015. Consumer terms and notices must be fair, transparent and prominent. An arrangement under which a motorist may physically enter the site, the only registration facility is inside closed premises, no alternative method is provided, no prominent prohibition is communicated, and a £100 charge is then imposed for failing to use an inaccessible device creates a substantial imbalance to the detriment of the consumer.

The contradiction between the Notice to Keeper and the rejection also demonstrates that the alleged terms are neither clear nor transparent. The Notice to Keeper alleges failure to register, while the rejection alleges an absence of permission to park. Where a consumer term or notice is capable of more than one meaning, the interpretation most favourable to the consumer must prevail. The operator cannot select whichever interpretation is most convenient after an appeal has exposed the weakness of its original case.

The operator cannot rely upon ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis as though that decision rendered every private parking charge enforceable. That case concerned clear and prominent signage, an intelligible two-hour parking scheme and an identified commercial justification. The present circumstances are materially different. The alleged term was not adequately visible during darkness, the registration mechanism was inaccessible, the operator has materially changed the allegation, and the stay lasted only approximately 17 minutes. The operator must prove the enforceability of its own contractual arrangements rather than relying upon the materially different facts of Beavis.

Separately, the operator has failed to establish keeper liability under Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. The driver has not been identified. The operator can recover any liability allegedly incurred by the driver from the keeper only by complying strictly with every mandatory requirement of Schedule 4. It has not done so.

Paragraph 9(2)(e) requires the Notice to Keeper to state that the creditor does not know both the name of the driver and a current address for service for the driver. The notice contains no such statement. Merely asking the keeper to provide the driver’s details does not satisfy the separate statutory requirement to state that those details are not known.

Paragraph 9(2)(f) requires a prescribed warning that, after the period of 28 days beginning with the day after that on which the notice is given, the creditor will have the right to recover the unpaid charge from the keeper if the creditor still does not know both the name of the driver and a current address for service for the driver. The notice instead refers vaguely to payment not having been received “after 28 days”. It does not identify the statutory starting point and omits the continuing condition concerning the driver’s name and address.

There is also a failure to specify a genuine period of parking as required by paragraph 9(2)(a). ANPR entry and exit timestamps establish only when the vehicle passed cameras. They do not establish when the vehicle was parked, when parking ended or the actual period of parking. A calculated duration between two camera events is not necessarily a period of parking.

The operator’s failure to comply with Schedule 4 means that no liability has transferred to me as keeper. Registered keeper status is not evidence that the keeper was the driver. There is no legal presumption that a registered keeper drove the vehicle, and the keeper is under no obligation to identify the driver. The civil standard of proof does not permit the operator or the IAS to fill an evidential vacuum with speculation. An inference must arise from actual evidence, and the operator has produced none identifying the driver.

To infer that the keeper was the driver merely because the keeper has not named that person would improperly circumvent Schedule 4 and render its statutory protections meaningless. Parliament provided a specific mechanism by which an operator may pursue a keeper when the driver is unknown. The operator failed to use that mechanism correctly and cannot avoid the consequences by asking the IAS to presume the very fact it is required to prove.

The operator is also put to strict proof of its contractual authority from the landowner. It must produce the contemporaneous, unredacted written agreement covering the precise land and material date, together with the relevant site boundary plan. That agreement must expressly authorise the operator to offer parking contracts in its own name, issue charges for the particular alleged contravention, retain the proceeds, pursue unpaid charges through the IAS and commence legal proceedings in its own name.

Given the operator’s contradictory position, the agreement must also establish whether the landowner authorised charges for failure to register, parking while the premises were closed, or both. A generic statement, expired agreement, unsigned document or witness statement asserting that authority exists will not prove the necessary contractual rights.

The ANPR evidence does not cure any of these defects. It establishes, at most, two occasions on which the vehicle passed cameras. It does not prove where the vehicle was parked, what signs were visible from that position, that the driver read or accepted any term, that reception was accessible, that the registration tablet was operational, that an alternative registration method existed or that any enforceable contract was formed.

The operator’s case is therefore internally contradictory and unsupported. The Notice to Keeper alleges failure to register. The rejection admits that the registration facility was inside closed premises and then attempts to substitute a different allegation that the driver had no permission to park. If registration was the relevant obligation, the operator made compliance impossible. If parking was prohibited outside opening hours, that is a different term which the operator must prove was prominently and unambiguously communicated. If no permission to park was offered, the operator cannot simultaneously rely upon a contractual licence and a contractual charge.

The signage and nighttime visibility are disputed, the operator has not established landowner authority, the ANPR evidence does not prove contract formation or breach, the driver has not been identified, and the Notice to Keeper does not comply with Schedule 4. The operator has consequently failed to establish any lawful liability against me as registered keeper. The appeal must be allowed and the Parking Charge Notice cancelled.

You’ll have to upload that as a pdf as their pathetic text box does not allow paste.