Yesterday, 06:36 PM
@SDC.99, that makes sense.
The tenancy agreement is the main contractual document. The tenants’ handbook and occupier information pack may not carry exactly the same contractual weight unless they are expressly incorporated into the tenancy, but they are still useful evidence. They show what the parking arrangements were when you moved in, what you were told at the time, and that parking was already governed by the landlord/housing association’s residential arrangements before Countrywide’s current PCN regime.
The documents appear to support the following broad position. You have been a resident since 2007. Parking was already regulated through the estate arrangements. Permits were issued as part of those arrangements, not as the source of a new contract with Countrywide. The documents refer to residents using proper/designated parking spaces and displaying permits. The old stated consequence for not displaying a permit was clamping/release fee, not a £100 postal parking charge from a third-party parking company.
That does not automatically become an agreement to pay Countrywide £100 for an alleged permit display issue. There is a clear difference between the landlord/housing association setting estate parking rules for residents, and a third party private parking contractor later claiming that its signs create a separate financial liability against a tenant.
The fact that there has been no updated tenancy agreement matters. If the 2007 tenancy has simply continued, then that remains the starting point unless the parking arrangements were properly varied. A later change from clamping to postal PCNs is not merely administrative. It changes the nature of the alleged liability. The old clamping provision cannot simply be treated as if it automatically became a right to issue £100 contractual charges.
Countrywide would need to prove more than the mere presence of signs on site. This is residential land occupied under a tenancy which has existed since 2007, with parking arrangements already governed by the tenancy documents and estate information provided at the start of the tenancy. A third-party parking company cannot unilaterally override those residential arrangements, derogate from the tenant’s existing rights, or impose a new £100 contractual liability simply by erecting signs. If Countrywide says the tenant became bound by its later parking charge regime, it must prove the legal basis for that, including the landholder’s authority, the relevant tenancy term or estate regulation relied upon, and any valid contractual or statutory variation mechanism.
The permit evidence is also important. Countrywide’s own photograph shows a resident permit in the windscreen. If the permit number, location ID and “Green” bay/area identifier were readable, the operative had the information needed to verify the permit. The allegation is not “no permit displayed”. It is “Permit Not Clearly Displayed”. A minor obstruction of the heading is weak where the essential identifying details were visible.
The initial appeal should not be turned into a full witness statement. Countrywide will probably reject it anyway, and the IAS is a kangaroo court, corrupted by the fact that they only look out for their IPC members. The purpose of the initial appeal is simply to put the key issues on record, avoid identifying the driver, and preserve the position if this ever reaches a county court claim. That is where this would be properly defendable.
Use this as the initial appeal:
The tenancy agreement is the main contractual document. The tenants’ handbook and occupier information pack may not carry exactly the same contractual weight unless they are expressly incorporated into the tenancy, but they are still useful evidence. They show what the parking arrangements were when you moved in, what you were told at the time, and that parking was already governed by the landlord/housing association’s residential arrangements before Countrywide’s current PCN regime.
The documents appear to support the following broad position. You have been a resident since 2007. Parking was already regulated through the estate arrangements. Permits were issued as part of those arrangements, not as the source of a new contract with Countrywide. The documents refer to residents using proper/designated parking spaces and displaying permits. The old stated consequence for not displaying a permit was clamping/release fee, not a £100 postal parking charge from a third-party parking company.
That does not automatically become an agreement to pay Countrywide £100 for an alleged permit display issue. There is a clear difference between the landlord/housing association setting estate parking rules for residents, and a third party private parking contractor later claiming that its signs create a separate financial liability against a tenant.
The fact that there has been no updated tenancy agreement matters. If the 2007 tenancy has simply continued, then that remains the starting point unless the parking arrangements were properly varied. A later change from clamping to postal PCNs is not merely administrative. It changes the nature of the alleged liability. The old clamping provision cannot simply be treated as if it automatically became a right to issue £100 contractual charges.
Countrywide would need to prove more than the mere presence of signs on site. This is residential land occupied under a tenancy which has existed since 2007, with parking arrangements already governed by the tenancy documents and estate information provided at the start of the tenancy. A third-party parking company cannot unilaterally override those residential arrangements, derogate from the tenant’s existing rights, or impose a new £100 contractual liability simply by erecting signs. If Countrywide says the tenant became bound by its later parking charge regime, it must prove the legal basis for that, including the landholder’s authority, the relevant tenancy term or estate regulation relied upon, and any valid contractual or statutory variation mechanism.
The permit evidence is also important. Countrywide’s own photograph shows a resident permit in the windscreen. If the permit number, location ID and “Green” bay/area identifier were readable, the operative had the information needed to verify the permit. The allegation is not “no permit displayed”. It is “Permit Not Clearly Displayed”. A minor obstruction of the heading is weak where the essential identifying details were visible.
The initial appeal should not be turned into a full witness statement. Countrywide will probably reject it anyway, and the IAS is a kangaroo court, corrupted by the fact that they only look out for their IPC members. The purpose of the initial appeal is simply to put the key issues on record, avoid identifying the driver, and preserve the position if this ever reaches a county court claim. That is where this would be properly defendable.
Use this as the initial appeal:
Quote:I appeal as the registered keeper. No admission is made as to the identity of the driver and I am not obliged to identify the driver.
The charge is denied.
The Notice to Keeper does not comply with Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. In particular, it does not specify any “period of parking” as required by paragraph 9(2)(a). It merely gives a single time/date. A single timestamp is not a period of parking. You are therefore unable to recover the charge from the registered keeper.
Further, your own photographs show that a valid resident permit was displayed in the front windscreen. The permit number, location ID and green area identifier were visible and readable. The allegation is “Permit Not Clearly Displayed”, but your own evidence shows that the essential information required to verify the permit was visible.
The vehicle belongs to a long-standing resident of The Chapel Estate. The resident’s tenancy and estate documents date back to 2007 and show that parking was already governed by the landlord/housing association’s residential parking arrangements. The permit is evidence of that resident entitlement. It is not accepted that Countrywide Parking Management Ltd can impose a separate £100 contractual charge on a resident merely by relying on later signage.
You are put to strict proof that the resident’s tenancy or estate parking arrangements were validly varied so as to impose a £100 contractual charge payable to Countrywide Parking Management Ltd for an alleged permit display issue.
The stated location is also disputed. The Notice refers to The Chapel Estate, SO14 5GL, whereas the vehicle was parked in a different area of the estate. You are put to strict proof of the exact location, the applicable signage at that precise location, and your authority to enforce at that location.
Please cancel the charge. If you reject this appeal, please provide the IAS appeal details and copies of all evidence relied upon, including the photographs, site plan, signage map, landholder authority, and the specific contractual terms said to create liability.
Never argue with stupid people. They will drag you down to their level and then beat you with experience. - Mark Twain
