02-09-2026, 10:20 AM
Welcome @kryten3000 . I don’t disagree. The point of the article/post was to explain why POPLA never had jurisdiction to adjudicate Penalty Notices in the first place, rather than to argue that anything material changed in POPLA’s favour in 2025.
It is important to look at what happened in 2025 as a combined legislative exercise. At the same time as PoFA was amended, the Railway Byelaws were also amended in a way that directly addresses parking. The most significant change was the complete restructuring of former Byelaw 14 and the insertion of new Byelaws 14A and 14B, together with the express exclusion of contractual parking schemes from the scope of Byelaw control.
For England and Wales, Byelaw 14A now governs the use, leaving and placing of vehicles on railway land. While it continues to regulate obstruction, misuse of land and non-compliance with genuine traffic signs or operational instructions, it explicitly states that neither “traffic signs” nor “instructions” include anything conveying the rules of a contractual parking scheme. That exclusion is critical. It makes clear that the Railway Byelaws do not regulate contractual parking arrangements at stations and do not criminalise failures to comply with private parking terms.
At the same time, Byelaw 24 was amended to replace the word “penalty” with “fine”, expressly confirming that Byelaw enforcement is criminal in nature and can only result in a fine imposed by a court. This removes any residual ambiguity about whether Byelaw enforcement could be treated as a civil or hybrid regime.
Taken together, these changes draw a bright and deliberate line between criminal regulation of railway operations and civil enforcement of parking contracts. Parking that is subject to a contractual scheme now sits outside the Byelaws entirely, while any remaining Byelaw enforcement is unequivocally criminal and reserved to the magistrates’ court. Contractual parking enforcement and Railway Byelaw offences are legally distinct and cannot be blended.
What this also exposes is that POPLA’s historic role in adjudicating Railway Byelaw Penalty Notices was never lawful to begin with. POPLA did not lose jurisdiction in 2025; it never had it. For years it purported to adjudicate so-called Penalty Notices despite being a private ADR scheme with no statutory footing and no criminal jurisdiction, relying on a non-binding 2018 DfT policy letter and importing concepts such as “owner liability” that do not exist in the Byelaws. That was not legal authority and not adjudication in law.
The 2025 amendments make that historical error impossible to ignore. By excluding contractual parking schemes from the Byelaws and by confirming that Byelaw enforcement results only in a criminal fine imposed by a court, Parliament has confirmed what was always the correct position: alleged Byelaw offences are matters for the magistrates’ court alone, and a private appeals body could never lawfully determine liability for them. The law has not changed POPLA’s position; it has simply made the absence of jurisdiction undeniable.
It is important to look at what happened in 2025 as a combined legislative exercise. At the same time as PoFA was amended, the Railway Byelaws were also amended in a way that directly addresses parking. The most significant change was the complete restructuring of former Byelaw 14 and the insertion of new Byelaws 14A and 14B, together with the express exclusion of contractual parking schemes from the scope of Byelaw control.
For England and Wales, Byelaw 14A now governs the use, leaving and placing of vehicles on railway land. While it continues to regulate obstruction, misuse of land and non-compliance with genuine traffic signs or operational instructions, it explicitly states that neither “traffic signs” nor “instructions” include anything conveying the rules of a contractual parking scheme. That exclusion is critical. It makes clear that the Railway Byelaws do not regulate contractual parking arrangements at stations and do not criminalise failures to comply with private parking terms.
At the same time, Byelaw 24 was amended to replace the word “penalty” with “fine”, expressly confirming that Byelaw enforcement is criminal in nature and can only result in a fine imposed by a court. This removes any residual ambiguity about whether Byelaw enforcement could be treated as a civil or hybrid regime.
Taken together, these changes draw a bright and deliberate line between criminal regulation of railway operations and civil enforcement of parking contracts. Parking that is subject to a contractual scheme now sits outside the Byelaws entirely, while any remaining Byelaw enforcement is unequivocally criminal and reserved to the magistrates’ court. Contractual parking enforcement and Railway Byelaw offences are legally distinct and cannot be blended.
What this also exposes is that POPLA’s historic role in adjudicating Railway Byelaw Penalty Notices was never lawful to begin with. POPLA did not lose jurisdiction in 2025; it never had it. For years it purported to adjudicate so-called Penalty Notices despite being a private ADR scheme with no statutory footing and no criminal jurisdiction, relying on a non-binding 2018 DfT policy letter and importing concepts such as “owner liability” that do not exist in the Byelaws. That was not legal authority and not adjudication in law.
The 2025 amendments make that historical error impossible to ignore. By excluding contractual parking schemes from the Byelaws and by confirming that Byelaw enforcement results only in a criminal fine imposed by a court, Parliament has confirmed what was always the correct position: alleged Byelaw offences are matters for the magistrates’ court alone, and a private appeals body could never lawfully determine liability for them. The law has not changed POPLA’s position; it has simply made the absence of jurisdiction undeniable.
Never argue with stupid people. They will drag you down to their level and then beat you with experience. - Mark Twain
