GroupNexus Moto Burton in Kendal

[b789]

@Foxy01, entirely predictable. They have now done exactly what was expected. Rather than properly addressing the PoFA defects raised in the appeal, they have issued a stock rejection and simply asserted that they are relying on Schedule 4 to hold the keeper liable because no driver details were provided. That is fine for our purposes, because it sharpens the issue for POPLA.

They are now expressly putting keeper liability in issue. POPLA can therefore be invited to decide the simple point: if the driver has not been identified, and if the operator wishes to hold the keeper liable, has the Notice to Keeper fully complied with PoFA? Our position remains that it has not, particularly in relation to paragraph 9(2)(e) and paragraph 9(2)(h). Their rejection does not cure those defects

You can use the following as your POPLA appeal:

I am the registered keeper of the vehicle and I appeal against this Parking Charge Notice.

The driver has not been identified and I am under no obligation to identify the driver. The operator has expressly stated in its rejection that it is seeking to rely on Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 to hold the keeper liable. It may only do so if the Notice to Keeper fully complies with the strict requirements of Schedule 4. It does not. Accordingly, no keeper liability arises and the appeal must be allowed.

I also attach a copy of the sealed order in ParkingEye Ltd v Ghansah, claim number M4FC56Q6, dated 29 December 2025. Whilst not binding authority, it is directly relevant because the court expressly held that a claim against a keeper failed where the notice to keeper did not include the invitation to pay required by PoFA paragraph 9(2)(e). It demonstrates that this is a real statutory defect with real legal consequences, not a matter that can properly be brushed aside.

1. No keeper liability. The Notice to Keeper does not comply with PoFA Schedule 4 paragraph 9(2)(e).

Paragraph 9(2)(e) requires the Notice to Keeper to state that the creditor does not know both the name of the driver and a current address for service for the driver and to invite the keeper either to pay the unpaid parking charge or, if the keeper was not the driver, to notify the creditor of the name of the driver and a current address for service for the driver and to pass the notice to the driver.

This Notice to Keeper does not properly give that statutory invitation to the keeper. Instead, it refers to the driver being liable and seeks the driver’s details, but it does not properly invite the keeper to pay the unpaid parking charge in the form required by PoFA. Keeper liability is purely statutory. If the operator wishes to rely upon it, it must comply strictly with the statute. It has not done so.

This is not a trivial or academic point. I attach a recent county court order, ParkingEye Ltd v Ghansah, claim number M4FC56Q6, dated 29 December 2025, in which the court expressly dismissed the claim because the claimant pursued the defendant as keeper, not driver, and the claimant’s notice to keeper “does not include the invitation to pay required by POFA paragraph 9(2)(e)”. That is not cited as binding authority, but as a clear example of a court recognising that this exact defect is fatal where keeper liability is being asserted. POPLA is not being asked to treat that order as precedent, but it is invited to recognise the obvious point it illustrates: paragraph 9(2)(e) is a mandatory statutory condition, not an optional form of words.

The operator’s rejection letter makes its position plain. It states that the charge was issued under Schedule 4 of PoFA and that, because no driver details were provided, the registered keeper is being held liable. That is an express reliance on PoFA. It therefore remains for the operator to demonstrate full compliance with paragraph 9(2)(e). It cannot do so.

As the Notice to Keeper does not comply with paragraph 9(2)(e), the operator has failed to establish any right to recover the charge from the keeper.

2. No keeper liability. The Notice to Keeper does not comply with PoFA Schedule 4 paragraph 9(2)(h).

Paragraph 9(2)(h) requires the Notice to Keeper to identify the creditor. That means the legal person said to be entitled to recover the parking charge.

This Notice to Keeper does not clearly identify the creditor. It uses GroupNexus branding, refers in the footer to CP Plus Limited (company number 02595379) t/a GroupNexus, and elsewhere refers to “our Client’s property”. That wording is not clear identification of the creditor. It leaves the recipient to infer the alleged creditor’s identity rather than stating it expressly.

That defect is particularly serious here because GroupNexus is no longer merely a trading name used by CP Plus Limited. GroupNexus Limited (company number 15560549) is now itself a separate incorporated legal entity. That is the crucial point. Historically, an operator might have argued that “GroupNexus” was simply branding for CP Plus Limited and nothing more. That is no longer safely arguable once GroupNexus Limited exists as a distinct company in its own right.

Accordingly, when this Notice to Keeper uses “GroupNexus” branding, refers in the footer to CP Plus Limited (company number 02595379) t/a GroupNexus, and also refers to “our Client’s property”, the recipient is left uncertain as to which legal person is allegedly the creditor. Is it said to be CP Plus Limited? Is it said to be GroupNexus Limited (company number 15560549)? Or is it some unnamed client or principal? The Notice does not say.

That is not a trivial technicality. The whole purpose of paragraph 9(2)(h) is to ensure that the recipient knows the identity of the creditor. PoFA requires the creditor to be identified clearly within the Notice to Keeper itself. It is not enough for the recipient to be left to guess from branding, trading styles or vague references to a client.

POPLA is therefore invited to understand the precise implication here: once GroupNexus Limited exists as a separate legal entity, the old casual use of “GroupNexus” as if it were merely a harmless trading label is no longer sufficient for PoFA purposes. The Notice must make clear which legal person is the creditor. This Notice fails to do so. Paragraph 9(2)(h) has therefore not been complied with.

The operator may not cure that defect later by assertion in its rejection letter. The statutory notice itself must comply.

3. The operator has not shown that the appellant is the driver.

I am the registered keeper. I am appealing only as keeper. The driver has not been identified.

There is no lawful presumption that the keeper was the driver and I am under no obligation to name the driver. If the operator cannot rely on PoFA, it cannot recover the parking charge from the keeper merely because the keeper has not named the driver.

The operator’s own rejection confirms that it is not alleging that it knows who the driver was. Instead, it seeks to rely on Schedule 4. Once that reliance fails, the appeal must succeed.

4. The operator has not shown a valid period of parking as required for keeper liability.

PoFA paragraph 9(2)(a) requires the Notice to Keeper to specify the relevant period of parking.

Operators using ANPR commonly record only entry and exit timestamps. Those are not the same thing as a proved period of parking. They merely show the times a vehicle passed cameras at the perimeter. They do not show when the vehicle was parked, whether the vehicle was queuing, manoeuvring, waiting for a space, reading signage, or exiting the site.

To the extent that this Notice to Keeper relies on ANPR entry and exit times, that is not the same as specifying an actual period of parking. The burden rests on the operator to prove that the period relied upon is in fact a period of parking and not merely site circulation time.

This is particularly important where the operator seeks to impose keeper liability under PoFA, because PoFA requires a period of parking, not simply two timestamped images showing the vehicle in motion.

5. The operator has not shown that the terms were clearly brought to the attention of the driver.

The operator asserts that there are clear signs at the entrance and throughout the site. That is not evidence. It is merely an assertion.

The operator is put to strict proof of the signage in place on the material date, including clear contemporaneous photographs and a site map showing the location of each sign, the wording on each sign, and the route by which a driver would encounter and be able to read them before any contract could be formed.

The operator’s rejection also mischaracterises my appeal as if it were based on mitigation. It was not. The appeal challenged keeper liability under statute. The stock rejection referring to “mitigating circumstances” suggests that the operator did not properly consider the actual grounds raised.

If the operator wishes to rely on signage to establish contractual liability, POPLA is invited to require strict proof that the signage was sufficiently prominent, legible and positioned so that the driver was given a fair opportunity to read and understand the terms before any contract could be formed.

6. The operator has not shown that it has landowner authority.

The operator is put to strict proof of full contemporaneous landowner authority for the material site and date.

A mere witness statement or redacted agreement is not enough unless it clearly shows that the operator was authorised by the landowner to issue parking charges and to pursue them in its own name. POPLA is invited to require production of the contemporaneous contract or chain of authority showing exactly who contracted with the operator and what rights were granted.

This is particularly relevant where the Notice to Keeper refers to “our Client’s property” rather than clearly identifying the creditor. That wording itself raises a question as to the legal basis on which the operator says it is entitled to recover the charge.

7. ANPR evidence is not sufficient without proof of accuracy, synchronisation and compliance.

If the operator relies on ANPR, it is put to strict proof that the system was working correctly on the material date, that the cameras were properly synchronised, that the images relate to the same single visit, and that the timestamps are accurate.

ANPR images of a vehicle entering and leaving a site do not, of themselves, establish the terms accepted, the point of contract formation, or the actual period parked. Nor do they prove that the driver saw, read and accepted any terms.

The operator should therefore be required to produce strict proof of the ANPR system’s reliability, calibration and audit trail for the material date.

For all of those reasons, the operator has failed to establish keeper liability and has failed to prove its case. I respectfully request that POPLA allows this appeal.

Attach the sealed order to the appeal.