03-30-2026, 02:50 PM
The critical point is that the byelaws apply to Bewl Bridge Reservoir and to all lands adjacent to the reservoir which are “vested in, or held by” the Authority, excluding only land over which a public right of way is exercisable. They also expressly regulate the leaving and parking of conveyances on that Authority Property.
So the starting position is not that the Keeper must prove the byelaws somehow survived a later lease or commercial arrangement. The starting position is that the byelaws were validly made, confirmed by the Secretary of State, and came into operation on 27 February 1979. Once in force, they remain in force unless lawfully revoked, replaced, or disapplied.
A mere lease, licence, management agreement or even sale of part of the estate to a third party does not, by itself, extinguish statutory byelaws. That would require proper legal analysis of the land transfer and, if relied upon, evidence that the land ceased to be within the byelaw area or that the byelaws were revoked or otherwise ceased to apply.
That is why the burden shifts.
If First Parking want to rely on PoFA keeper liability, and the Keeper now has a confirmed set of byelaws which on their face regulate parking and vehicle use at Bewl Bridge Reservoir, then it is for First Parking to prove that the precise parcel of land where they operate falls outside the land to which those byelaws apply, or that the byelaws were revoked or otherwise ceased to have effect there.
Absent such proof, the sensible and legally coherent position is that parking on that land is subject to statutory control and therefore the land is not “relevant land” for the purposes of Schedule 4 PoFA.
The key wording is byelaw 15, which expressly regulates where conveyances may be left, where motor vehicles may be left, and compliance with traffic signs and speed limits on the Authority Property. That is squarely statutory control of vehicles on the land.
The existence of a commercial third-party operation on part of a wider statutory estate does not of itself strip away byelaws. Unless and until the operator can show a statutory revocation or that the land is genuinely outside the byelaw footprint, you, the Keeper, have a strong basis to say the site is not relevant land.
For now, respond to the LoC with the following and attach a copy of the byelaws. Send it by email to info@dcblegal.co.uk and cc yourself.
So the starting position is not that the Keeper must prove the byelaws somehow survived a later lease or commercial arrangement. The starting position is that the byelaws were validly made, confirmed by the Secretary of State, and came into operation on 27 February 1979. Once in force, they remain in force unless lawfully revoked, replaced, or disapplied.
A mere lease, licence, management agreement or even sale of part of the estate to a third party does not, by itself, extinguish statutory byelaws. That would require proper legal analysis of the land transfer and, if relied upon, evidence that the land ceased to be within the byelaw area or that the byelaws were revoked or otherwise ceased to apply.
That is why the burden shifts.
If First Parking want to rely on PoFA keeper liability, and the Keeper now has a confirmed set of byelaws which on their face regulate parking and vehicle use at Bewl Bridge Reservoir, then it is for First Parking to prove that the precise parcel of land where they operate falls outside the land to which those byelaws apply, or that the byelaws were revoked or otherwise ceased to have effect there.
Absent such proof, the sensible and legally coherent position is that parking on that land is subject to statutory control and therefore the land is not “relevant land” for the purposes of Schedule 4 PoFA.
The key wording is byelaw 15, which expressly regulates where conveyances may be left, where motor vehicles may be left, and compliance with traffic signs and speed limits on the Authority Property. That is squarely statutory control of vehicles on the land.
The existence of a commercial third-party operation on part of a wider statutory estate does not of itself strip away byelaws. Unless and until the operator can show a statutory revocation or that the land is genuinely outside the byelaw footprint, you, the Keeper, have a strong basis to say the site is not relevant land.
For now, respond to the LoC with the following and attach a copy of the byelaws. Send it by email to info@dcblegal.co.uk and cc yourself.
Quote:Dear Sirs,
I refer to your Letter of Claim.
The alleged debt is denied.
Your claim is fundamentally misconceived. The location is Bewl Bridge Reservoir. The enclosed byelaws, made under section 22(6) of the Countryside Act 1968, expressly apply to the reservoir and adjacent land held by the Authority, and regulate the driving, leaving and parking of vehicles. That land is therefore subject to statutory control and is not “relevant land” for the purposes of Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. Keeper liability is unavailable. Any assertion to the contrary is incorrect.
If your client disputes this, it is put to strict proof of the exact legal status of the land, the precise boundaries relied upon, and any lawful revocation or disapplication of those byelaws. A lease, licence or commercial arrangement does not extinguish statutory control.
Your Letter of Claim proceeds on a false premise by asserting liability as “keeper or driver”. No admission is made as to the identity of the driver, and your client is not entitled to infer it.
Further, your Letter of Claim is deficient and non-compliant with the Pre-Action Protocol for Debt Claims. You have failed to provide the documents required to understand or properly respond to the claim. Provide the following:
1. All notices relied upon, including the Notice to Keeper.
2. All ANPR images and data.
3. Contemporaneous photographs of all signage relied upon.
4. A site plan showing signage locations and the land boundary.
5. The unredacted landowner contract or chain of authority.
6. Documentary proof that the land is not subject to the enclosed byelaws.
7. A full breakdown and justification of the additional £70.
The matter must now be placed on hold for not less than 30 days pending full compliance.
If proceedings are issued without addressing the statutory control issue and without providing the requested documents, this will be drawn to the court’s attention as unreasonable conduct.
Yours faithfully,
[Name]
Never argue with stupid people. They will drag you down to their level and then beat you with experience. - Mark Twain

