3 private parking tickets being pursued for all 3 and had a ccj claim made

[b789]

If the claimant has not yet submitted their WS, you cannot fully state your case in your WS. I suggest you open your WS with a preliminary statement as follows:

PRELIMINARY MATTER: DEFECTIVE PARTICULARS OF CLAIM

1. Before addressing the factual allegations made against me, I raise a preliminary issue concerning the adequacy of the Particulars of Claim.

2. The Claimant asserts a cause of action in contract. However, the Particulars of Claim do not state whether the alleged contract is said to be written, oral, or formed by conduct.

3. The Particulars of Claim do not identify the date of any alleged contract, do not set out the contractual terms relied upon, do not identify the clause said to have been breached, and do not explain how the sum claimed is calculated by reference to any contractual provision.

4. CPR 16.4(1)(a) requires a claimant to include a concise statement of the facts on which the claimant relies.

5. Practice Direction 16 paragraph 7.3 further requires that where a claim is based on a written agreement, a copy must be attached or the relevant terms must be set out in the Particulars of Claim; and where a claim is based on an oral agreement, the words spoken, by whom, to whom, and when must be pleaded.

6. In Liberty Homes (Kent) Ltd v Rajakanthan & Ors [2022] EWHC 2201 (TCC), Mrs Justice Jefford DBE considered materially similar deficiencies. At paragraph 106, the Court held that where the matters required by the Practice Direction are missing, the pleading “does not provide a concise statement of the claimant’s claim in accordance with the rules” and should be struck out.

7. At paragraph 108, the Court further held that where a pleading fails to identify a proper contractual basis, it discloses “no reasonable grounds for bringing the claim”.

8. I understand Liberty Homes to be a High Court decision and therefore binding authority. In my view, the deficiencies identified in paragraphs 106–108 of that judgment apply directly to the present case.

9. The absence of pleaded contractual terms prevents me from properly understanding the contractual case I am required to meet and prevents the Court from identifying the legal foundation of the claim.

10. I therefore respectfully raise this as a preliminary matter for the Court’s consideration before turning to the substantive factual issues.

SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE TO THE CLAIM

11. I am the Defendant in this matter and at all material times I was the lawful tenant of Wheatstone House, 650–654 Chiswick High Road, W4 5BB, under a fixed term assured shorthold tenancy granted by London and Quadrant Housing Trust (Exhibit 5).

12. Clause 4.15 of my tenancy agreement regulates vehicles and parking. It expressly governs where vehicles may be parked on land owned by the landlord.

13. The tenancy agreement grants me a pre-existing right to park. That right does not arise from signage and is not conditional upon entering into any contract with a third party parking operator.

14. Clause 4.15.1 permits parking in a parking bay and on a driveway with hardstanding and a dropped kerb. On the dates of the alleged contraventions, the vehicle was positioned either in a parking bay or on a driveway with hardstanding and a dropped kerb, consistent with my tenancy rights.

15. There is no provision within my tenancy agreement granting the Claimant authority to issue parking charges to me as tenant, nor any clause permitting the landlord to delegate enforcement rights that would override or derogate from the tenancy.

16. I did not enter into any contract with the Claimant. I already held a lawful right to park. I had no reason to read, consider or accept any alleged contractual offer from the Claimant.

17. The signage relied upon by the Claimant is vague and prohibitive in nature. It refers to “access roads” and “roadways” without clearly defining those areas and without explaining how such wording interacts with residents’ tenancy rights.

18. I did not accept any contractual offer from the Claimant, and I did not intend to create any legal relationship with them.

19. The Parking Charge Notices record only single timestamps. They do not specify any defined period of parking.

20. Schedule 4 paragraph 9(2)(a) of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 requires a Notice to Keeper to “specify the vehicle, the relevant land on which it was parked and the period of parking to which the notice relates.” The statutory requirement is for a period, not a moment in time.

21. In Brennan v PPS (2024), the court confirmed that recording a single instant is insufficient. The judge made clear that without identification of a period of parking, it cannot be determined whether the vehicle was present only briefly, for example while the driver was considering the terms before deciding whether to remain. A single timestamp does not demonstrate any period of parking.

22. The Claimant’s notices do not identify any period of parking. They therefore fail to comply with paragraph 9(2)(a), and keeper liability cannot arise.

23. I have never identified the driver. There is no legal obligation upon a registered keeper to do so.

24. The Claimant has asserted in correspondence that it may rely upon a “reasonable assumption” that the registered keeper was the driver.

25. In VCS Ltd v Edward (2023) [HOKF6C9C], HHJ Gargan held at paragraph 35.3 that no inference can properly be drawn from keeper status alone and that it is for the claimant to prove, by evidence, that the defendant was the driver. Keeper status is not evidence of driving.

26. The Claimant has produced no evidence identifying me as the driver. Driver liability is therefore denied.

27. The Parking Charge Notices state the location as “Wheatstone House, 650 Chiswick High Road, W4 5SA.” My tenancy agreement clearly identifies the property as “Wheatstone House, 650–654 Chiswick High Road, W4 5BB” (Exhibit 5).

28. The Particulars of Claim refer only to “Wheatstone House, London,” without specifying the full and correct address. That description is ambiguous and does not clearly identify the relevant land.

29. The inconsistencies in the address details bring into question whether the Claimant has properly identified the land on which the alleged contraventions are said to have occurred, and whether Schedule 4 has been complied with.

30. The sum claimed includes additional “debt recovery” costs. No contractual term has been identified permitting recovery of those sums, and no calculation is set out in the Particulars of Claim.

31. I deny that any enforceable contract was formed with the Claimant, deny that any tenancy term was breached, deny that keeper liability has been established, and deny that the Claimant is entitled to the sums claimed or any sum at all.

32. I respectfully request that the Court dismiss the claim.

This now reads:

• Procedural strike-out (Liberty Homes)
  
• Tenancy primacy
  
• No contract
  
• PoFA period failure (Brennan)
  
• No driver inference (Edward)
  
• Land identification defect
  
• Unlawful add-ons
  
• Clean conclusion
  

Don't forget to include the necessary court header and the Statement of Truth (SoT). Check for exhibits and reference them properly in the WS. I've linked to the relevant transcripts referenced.

If you receive the claimants WS before the deadline on 6th March, let us know. Do not submit your WS bundle until the deadline and remember to CC in the Claimants solicitors.